Vulnerability details

## Vulnerability Details **File**: `node.js` **Function**: `normalizeStats()` (line ~214), reached from `getStat()` (called **unconditionally** on every `browserslist()` call) and `loadStat()` ### Root Cause ```js function normalizeStats(data, stats) { if (!data) { data = {} } if (stats && 'dataByBrowser' in stats) { stats = stats.dataByBrowser } if (typeof stats !== 'object') return undefined var normalized = {} for (var i in stats) { var versions = Object.keys(stats[i]) if (versions.length === 1 && data[i] && data[i].versions.length === 1) { var normal = data[i].versions[0] normalized[i] = {} normalized[i][normal] = stats[i][versions[0]] } else { normalized[i] = stats[i] } } return normalized } ``` `stats` is untrusted: it comes from `JSON.parse()`-ing a `browserslist-stats.json` file — auto-discovered by walking up the directory tree from the project root **on every `browserslist()` call, regardless of the query** (`env.getStat(opts, browserslist.data)` runs unconditionally inside `browserslist()`) — or from `opts.stats` passed programmatically / via the CLI's `--stats=` flag. `data` is `browserslist.data`, a plain object populated only with real browser names. Two independent bugs from the same root cause (unguarded `for...in` over untrusted keys used with plain-object bracket access/assignment): 1. **Crash**: `data[i]` has no `hasOwnProperty` guard. If `stats` contains a key that also happens to be an inherited `Object.prototype` member name — `"__proto__"`, `"toString"`, `"valueOf"`, `"constructor"`, `"hasOwnProperty"`, `"isPrototypeOf"`, etc. — `data[i]` resolves to that inherited function/object (always truthy), and the code then does `data[i].versions.length` → `undefined.length` → **uncaught `TypeError`**, for any such key whose JSON value has exactly one sub-key, e.g.: ```json { "toString": { "onekey": 5 }, "chrome": { "100": 50 } } ``` 2. **Prototype write**: `normalized[i] = ...` on the fresh `normalized = {}` — if `i` is exactly `"__proto__"` (and `normalized` has no own property by that name yet), this computed assignment invokes the real `Object.prototype.__proto__` setter, changing `normalized`'s actual `[[Prototype]]` instead of creating a plain property. Because this runs on **every** `browserslist()` call regardless of the query, simply committing a poisoned `browserslist-stats.json` anywhere in a project's directory tree breaks every subsequent Browserslist call in that project — including calls made by Autoprefixer, Babel `preset-env`, Stylelint, or PostCSS internally, for completely unrelated queries. ### Attack Scenario 1. Attacker submits a PR (or a compromised dependency) adding a `browserslist-stats.json` file anywhere between the project root and filesystem root, containing e.g. `{"toString": {"onekey": 5}, "chrome": {"100": 50}}`. 2. The victim's build/CI pipeline runs any tool that calls `browserslist()` internally, for **any** query. 3. The auto-discovered poisoned file crashes the process with an uncaught `TypeError` on the very first call. ### Measured Impact Confirmed crash (real `browserslist()` call, v4.28.6) with `stats` keys: `__proto__`, `toString`, `valueOf`, `hasOwnProperty`, `constructor`, `isPrototypeOf` — each paired with a one-key JSON object — for any query, including `browserslist('defaults')` which never mentions stats. ### Recommended Fix (implemented and verified) ```js var normalized = Object.create(null) for (var i in stats) { var versions = Object.keys(stats[i]) var known = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(data, i) && data[i] if (versions.length === 1 && known && known.versions.length === 1) { var normal = known.versions[0] normalized[i] = Object.create(null) normalized[i][normal] = stats[i][versions[0]] } else { normalized[i] = stats[i] } } return normalized ``` `normalized` uses `Object.create(null)` so a write to `"__proto__"` is an ordinary property set, never a `[[Prototype]]` change; `data[i]` is replaced with an explicit `hasOwnProperty` check so it never resolves to an inherited `Object.prototype` member. **Verification**: - `NODE_ENV=test npx uvu test .test.js` → 301/301 pass unmodified (`test/custom.test.js`, `test/shareable-stats.test.js`, `test/cover.test.js` exercise the stats-handling paths). - All 6 previously crash-inducing keys, tested individually, now resolve without error. - The realistic file-based auto-discovery scenario (poisoned `browserslist-stats.json` + an unrelated `browserslist('defaults')` call) now returns a normal result instead of crashing. ### Impact - **Who is affected**: Any project whose build/CI invokes Browserslist (directly or via Autoprefixer/Babel/Stylelint/PostCSS) in a directory tree an attacker can place a file into (external PR, compromised dependency), or any app that passes user-influenced data into `opts.stats`. - **What an attacker achieves**: Immediate DoS — crashes the invoking process on the first Browserslist call after the file is present, for any query, no special syntax needed. - **Conditions required**: No authentication — only the ability to add a file to the project's directory tree, or influence `opts.stats`. ### Verification Environment browserslist @ HEAD (== v4.28.6, current latest stable release) under local Node.js v20.19.5. Pure JS library — executed directly, no server needed. ### Note Found via a systematic review of prototype-pollution-adjacent patterns in this codebase after confirming two unrelated algorithmic-complexity issues (reported separately as GHSA-rrmg-cfrq-23vv and GHSA-g6p8-hj8g-x889) in the same research pass. A similar `for...in` + bracket-write pattern in `index.js`'s `copyObject()` (used by `normalizeAndroidData`) was already guarded against `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys by a prior, unrelated commit — that guard was never applied to this function.