Vulnerability details
Vulnerability
Data from Dependency-Track
Affected versions
Score
Description
### Summary
The `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284).
### Details
When the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `['a', 'b', 'c']`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation.
**Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
return val.split(',');
}
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}
return val;
```
The `split(',')` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p).
### PoC
**Test 1 - Basic bypass:**
```
npm install qs
```
```js
const qs = require('qs');
const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5)
const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true };
try {
const result = qs.parse(payload, options);
console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful)
} catch (e) {
console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message); // Not thrown
}
```
**Configuration:**
- `comma: true`
- `arrayLimit: 5`
- `throwOnLimitExceeded: true`
Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error.
Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26.
### Impact
Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.
### Suggested Fix
Move the `arrayLimit` check before the comma split in `parseArrayValue`, and enforce it on the resulting array length. Use `currentArrayLength` (already calculated upstream) for consistency with bracket notation fixes.
**Current code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
return val.split(',');
}
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}
return val;
```
**Fixed code:**
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
const splitArray = val.split(',');
if (splitArray.length > options.arrayLimit - currentArrayLength) { // Check against remaining limit
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
} else {
// Optionally convert to object or truncate, per README
return splitArray.slice(0, options.arrayLimit - currentArrayLength);
}
}
return splitArray;
}
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}
return val;
```
This aligns behavior with indexed and bracket notations, reuses `currentArrayLength`, and respects `throwOnLimitExceeded`. Update README to note the consistent enforcement.
Same vulnerability as